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ABSTRACT 
Title of Dissertation: AN ANALYSIS OF THE EFFICIENCY AND 
COMPETITIVENESS OF UMM QASR PORT IN IRAQ 
The dissertation is a study of the importance of cost/time of a ship related to the 
problems and constraints in port facilities and the quality of services that are hampering 
Umm Qasr Port (‘UQP’) to be a competitive and efficient port. It develops and asks the 
composite research question: “Can UQP improve its competitiveness by modifications 
to its facilities, and if so, which modifications are necessary?” Under the Port User Cost 
concept it analyses the turnaround time of vessels in the port as the most important 
element concerning the users of the port. Therefore, subsequent analysis of outcomes 
aims to solve the problems which influence and hinder the competitive level of UQP. 
The reasons behind this topic are results of the competition of neighbouring ports in the 
same region in attracting cargo owners and shipping lines to transport their cargo over 
land to Iraq as a way to increase the Iraqi economy and projects relating to the 
reconstruction of infra- and superstructures of the country after several wars. 
Analytical techniques will be applied to port operations involving the port facilities, and 
quality of services. It will also refer to the geographical location in connection with 
hinterlands of neighbouring port countries, for example Kuwait, Syria, Turkey and 
Jordan to measure UQP’s efficiency to identify the problems that need to be solved in 
order to place UQP in line with increasing Iraqi cargo volume, and development in the 
maritime sector in Iraq’s neighbouring countries. 
Considering the damage of years of wars in Iraq followed by huge budgets for several 
projects to rehabilitate the country, the need of Iraqi ports, in particular Umm Qasr Port, 
is to be more effective and efficient in receiving vessels with attractive services, with 
fewer delays and lower costs by improving UQP’s competitiveness and performance in 
terms of service time.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1  BACKGROUND  
Iraq is gradually expanding its trade with the international community, via exports and 
imports.  The state’s economy has to recover damages caused by many years of war. In 
the last decade, the main sources of Iraq’s imports have been Turkey, Jordan, Vietnam, 
the United States, Germany, and Britain. In the meantime, the GDP has increased 
slightly in recent years. 
The United Nations’ Joint Analysis Policy Unit (UN-JAPU, 2013) has issued a 
background paper on Iraq’s budget for 2013. The Government expenditure for 2013 
totals IQD 138.4 Trillion ($ 118.3 Billion), with an increase of 18% over 2012 and 
exceeding 70% of GDP
1
. On the other hand, Iraq is developing its oil industry together 
with global oil companies to increase oil export capacity which will require more 
equipment to be imported from other countries. 
It is a well-known fact that about 90% of the global trade is by sea transport, which is 
considered to be a mechanism for world trade. The global network of merchant ships 
provides one of the most important modes of transportation. Global trade movements 
connect with ports of call as a link with other transportation networks. 
Therefore, there is an urgent need to develop the transport sector in general and ports in 
particular to assist in facilitating such huge development plans to meet with the 
mentioned projects and extraordinary budget allocation. UQP, the major port in Iraq, has 
the potential to endeavor faster to handle increasing cargo and to be a competitive port in 
the region. The research will discuss the factors that affect such fast growth and try to 
recommend solutions to the port authority to take serious actions to meet future 
requirements. 
                                                         
1
 Posted on 30 January 2013. Tags: Budget, Joint Analysis Policy Unit (JAPU), United Nations 
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Competition from neighboring ports is substantial although UQP is able to compete and 
attract new traffic with its existing facilities and services if its performance and 
competitiveness level increases. However, the neighboring ports continue to pose a 
challenge for the UQP maritime sector. 
On the other hand the UQP faced under-utilization as a result of the long turnaround 
time of vessels staying at the port while competing neighbouring ports in Kuwait, Syria, 
Turkey and Jordan have been more attractive to the shipping lines and shippers causing 
Iraq-bound commodities to be imported by land transportation even though these 
alternative ways of transport are more costly. 
These factors will be determined by quality of services in terms of the time in a port of a 
vessel, appropriate port facilities to be in line with development projects established by 
JICA , Japan International Cooperation Agency and other Iraqi and donor projects which 
will be highlighted  in this research, and finally the geographical location in connection 
with hinterlands of neighbouring ports, which may give rise to shipping lines and cargo 
owners avoiding the long-time cost in a port of a vessel if not addressed these factors 
will lead to transport of cargo overland rather than through UQP. And another important 
factor as mentioned above is Iraqi ports are restricted by their reduced capacity due to 
several wars that affected their appropriate infrastructure, superstructure and technical 
facilities. Taken together, the UQP has become expensive port related to the time cost as 
it has a gap in port efficiency.  
1.2  CURRENT SITUATION OF IRAQ  
The Iraqi economy has been affected by wars and political instability in various conflicts 
over the past decades, which destroyed its economic structures.  However, the situation 
has continuously improved in recent years, providing a foundation for studying 
increasing port competitiveness in this research. The need for such research could be 
realized as a first impression when looking at Iraqi economic background and projects of 
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extraordinary budget allocation, which increase estimations of cargo volumes and time 
spent by ships at UQP. Therefore, the need speed up cargo handling and solve other 
essential issues related to the time of the vessels at the port is urgent.  
1.2.1 IRAQI ECONOMIC SITUATION 
The Iraqi-Iranian War 1980-1988, Gulf war 1990 and economic embargo actions taken 
by the United Nations followed by foreign occupation and terrorist activities after a 
dictatorial regime of more than 30 years were various tragic events in Iraqi impacting on 
its economic situation.  However, the Iraqi economy rose again as it is dominated by the 
oil and gas sector, and crude oil for its revenues as well as The World Bank’s portfolio 
which are together aiding to spur Iraqi economic activities.  
The need to rebuild the Iraqi economy and recall the damage that happened due to the 
above mentioned events is urgent. Rebuilding its infrastructure and institutions through 
several projects implemented by Iraqi governmental authorities with implementation 
support from the World Bank consists of 22 projects valued at US$854 million, 
accompanied by an increase in foreign investment to increase economic activity in Iraq.  
It is well known that the increase of goods is growing along with GDP per capita as the 
people consume goods accordingly which is resulting in an increase in imported cargo in 
particularly container cargo. The GDP has increased by  9.78% to  US$ 233.292 Billion, 
making Iraq No. 46 in world rankings according to GDP (Current Prices, US Dollars) in 
2013 (IMF, 2013), with 9.7% agricultural production, 29.8% services and 60.5% 
industrial production. In addition, taking into account the increase in population to over 
32.6 million people, the economic growth is still on a comparable level in terms of GDP 
per capita as shown in Table 1:   
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Table 1 Key Economic Figures of Iraq 
Indicator Name 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
GNI per capita, PPP (current international $) 3010 3250 3430 3670 3920 4300
Population, total (Million) 28.7 29.5 30.2 31 32 32.6
GDP (current US$Billion) 88.8 131.6 111.7 135.5 180.6 210.3
GDP growth (annual %) 1.38 6.61 5.81 5.86 8.58 8.43
Life expectancy at birth, total (years) 67.86407317 67.87112195 68.0915122 68.48604878 68.9845122  
Source: (World Bank, 2013)  
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/reports/tableview.aspx  
Moreover, according to Iraq-business news reports on 15 August 2013 (Iraq-
businessnews, 2013), the Electricity funds, with the Ministry’s budget for this year are 
being increased to $14 billion to solve the major problem of distribution of electricity in 
Iraq related to blackouts as a part of the reconstruction of Iraq among other huge 
reforms.  
In fact since mid-2009, oil export earnings have returned to levels seen before Operation 
“Iraqi Freedom”. Iraq recently has made contracts with major oil companies, and has the 
potential to greatly expand its oil revenues, which requires the country to upgrade its oil 
processing, pipeline and import and export infrastructures to achieve this potential 
(Financial Report, 2013). 
Based on earnings from the oil industry, the country is currently initiating numerous 
reconstruction and modernization projects throughout Iraq. Along with these 
investments, the per capita income, and consequently, the demand for consumption are 
expected to increase as well.  
 “Iraq has the fifth largest proven crude oil reserves in the world, and it passed Iran 
as the second largest producer of crude oil in OPEC at the end of 2012, Iraq was the 
sixth largest net exporter of petroleum liquids in the world in 2012, with the 
majority of its oil exports going to the United States and to refineries in Asia. After 
years of power shortages, Iraqi efforts to increase generating capacity are moving 
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forward. Iraq plans to triple generating capacity to 27 gigawatts by the end of 2015” 
(EIA, 2013) . 
 However, the security situation has negative impacts on clients that are dealing with 
huge Iraqi projects. 
In recent years, the security situation has improved, thus laying the foundation for the 
advancement of oil exports and a first step to foreign investments. However, Iraq’s 
transportation infrastructure is not enough for the scale of current port operations. 
The situation above, Port Users will obtain a confidence in Iraq’s economic development 
spurring them to transport their cargoes either by port facilities effectively in UQP, or, 
choosing the neighboring ports for cost-effective transportation of the cargo.  
In conclusion, it is inferred from the above that Iraq’s economy has increased 
dramatically to give rise to increase in cargo volume, requiring that the Iraqi ports, in 
particular UQP, should be developed to render good service and maintain and attract its 
clients. 
1.2.2 UMM QASR PORT  
The Umm Qasr Port ‘UQP’ is the most important port in Iraq among the five 
commercial ports namely, Khor Az Zubayr ‘KZP’, Abu Floss, Al Faw and Al Maqil 
ports.  
The UQP was built in 1962 and five years later was operated by GCPI.  It has adequate 
storage space as the north and south port of Umm Qasr consist of 160,000m² and of 
800,000m² of open storage area. In Figure 1, the terminal area of berths of UQPN is 
illustrated from an overhead perspective, also shown are the five commercial Iraqi ports.  
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Figure 1 UQP and other Iraqi ports Location 
 
 
   Source: (JICA, 2012)  
Interim Report, Data Collection Survey on Port Development Plan in Iraq 
The 50,000 DWT class vessels can access the channel to the port, taking into account the 
time of high water tide as the average depth for the 50 nautical mile channel from buoy # 
1 to Umm Qasr is 12.5m. UQP is divided into a north port ‘UQPN’ and south port 
‘UQPS’, which is considered the commercial deep-water port of the country. Both of 
them consist of 24 berths, including 20 berths and 2 Ro/Ro-berths as well as 2 berths 
recently are added, under names 11 a and 11 b at area nearby berth 11, for general 
merchandise, containers, and other various cargos with channel depth of 12.5 m, 
resulting in a global and maintainable supply chain active connection for importing and 
exporting goods.  
The access channel for UQP is Khor Abdullah which extends from the entrance located 
at the north-west edge of the Arabian Gulf (Buoy No. 1 is placed) and was originally 
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designed to be min. 200 m wide, with a 12.5 m draft below A.C.D, astronomical chart 
datum, within approximately 50 Miles long.   
Competition from neighboring ports is substantial although UQP is able to compete and 
attract new traffic with its existing facilities and services if its performance and 
competitiveness level increase. However, the neighboring ports continue to pose a 
challenge for the UQP maritime sector. They are positioning themselves to develop an 
entire maritime cluster of industries and services. Iraq’s geographical location features 
natural hinterlands linking Kuwait, Syria, Jordan, and Turkey as well as Iran with 
connections to their ports as shown in Figure (2): 
Figure 2 Neighbouring Ports connected to Iraq 
  
Source: Author, Google, 2013 (Google, 2013) https://maps.google.se/ 
Study is, therefore, necessary for Iraq performance ports to measure their efficiency. 
That is required to ensure that the facilities operate well and that the time in port of a 
vessel is minimized.  Otherwise, the hinterland will be a good alternative for the users to 
transport their cargoes instead of Iraqi ports.   
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1.3  UQP UNDER-UTILIZATION AND TIME PROBLEMS 
In the 1980’s in the Iraq-Iran war, Port activities diminished significantly, which made 
the UQP receives a small quantity of cargo. Therefore, the port has faced a problem, an 
underutilization which made the port less efficient and allowed its facilities to become 
older and useless. It has taken many years to clear explosives and wreckage from the 
part and sedimentation from the bottom of the channel to allow ships to use it safely. 
Many factors of operations and management difficulties, therefore, have come together 
due to the problem of under-utilization, resulting in a prolonged turnaround time for 
vessels, which made the UQP an expensive port related to the cost of time.  
Table (2) is shown how cargo volume and number of vessels at the UQP fluctuated from 
1977 to 2010 which means the port has experienced difficulties during the period of the 
wars and events of economic embargo. 
 Table 2 Total Cargo Volume in UQP 
Umm Qasr Port Total Port Port
Cargo Ship Annual
Volume Calls Growth Capacity Utiliasation
(x 1,000 tons) %
1977 3,173 222  5,250         60.44         
1998 3,913 295 23 8,950         43.72         
1999 3,843 287 -2 8,950         42.94         
2000 6,022 397 57 8,950         67.28         
2001 7,001 533 16 8,950         78.22         
2002 6,083 512 -13 8,950         67.97         
2003 1,682 512 -72 8,950         18.79         
2004 2,105 894 25 8,950         23.52         
2005 3,244 503 54 8,950         36.25         
2006 7,659 858 136 18,200       42.08         
2007 6,310 876 -18 18,200       34.67         
2008 7,595 898 20 18,200       41.73         
2009 7,662 1,146 1 18,200       42.10         
2010 7,513 1,106 -2 18,200       41.28         
2011 8,622         992 15 18,200       47.37         
2012 9,335         922 8 18,200       51.29         
Year
 
Source: GCPI Statistics & (JICA, 2012)  
UQP statistic and Interim Report, Data Collection Survey on Port Development Plan in Iraq 
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The port started with a good standard utilisation of 60% according to UNCTAD as a 
general cargo port. However, after the Iraq-Iran war from 1980 to 1988 and the Gulf 
War in 1990 followed by embargo until 1999, the port started to decline sharply into 
under utilisation until 1999, the period of exchange of food and oil by the UN. After that 
the port has declined again in cargo volume since 2003 with a handling volume of 
1,681,000 tons. The total cargo volumes increased after making the lowest volume in 
2003. Although, there was a slight growth in the annual capacity in 2012 compared with 
past years, it may not continue as there is, nowadays, an opportunity  due to Syria’s ports 
being closed temporarily due to the current crisis, which will affect this growth when the 
political events improve. 
The problem of vessels staying a long time at the UQP is one of the symptoms of the 
underutilization problem. According to the annual statistics of the UQP in 2011, 
container vessels were spent about 4 days and break-bulk of general cargo and other 
vessels about 13 days on average in UQP. Furthermore, the case is worse with dry bulk 
carriers like grain vessels which spent about 21 days as there are long procedures as 
shown in section  4.4.3.Therefore, a study of turnaround a time of the vessel at UQP is 
necessary in order to identify problems and propose solutions toward effective and 
efficient port operations.   
1.4  RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
To achieve the research goal the author needs to identify and determine the port 
operations related to the time in port of a vessel. Constraints and problems at the port 
will be highlighted to know which aspects need to be taken care of in order to be able to 
improve the port’s competitiveness and efficiency.  Under the Port User Cost concept it 
will analyse turnaround time of the vessel in the port as the most important element 
concerning the user of the port. Therefore, the analysis will be applied to solve the 
problems that influence and hinder the competitive level and performance of UQP, 
eventually making it more attractive to users.    
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1.5  HOW TO RESEARCH  
Figure 3 shows the structure of this dissertation and the methodologies used according to 
Professor Moon lecture handouts (2013). 
Figure 3 Dissertation Structure 
  
Underutilization and time cost problems 
Port Facilities Service Quality Geographic Location  
Methodology that used to measure the Efficiency of port  
Questionnaires KPIs  
Outputs Outputs 
  
Analysis of Results  
Conclusion & Recommendations 
Implications of UQP 
Competitiveness 
Umm Qasr Port ‘UQP’ Competitiveness 
Literature of review 
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1.6  RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
In this research the author plans to use the following methodology, a literature review, a 
questionnaire as well as KPI analysis in order to identify the problems and constraints that 
prolong the time of vessels to improve the competitiveness and efficiency of the UQP. 
A literature review is used to study significant previous research, reports and conferences 
which have been pursued on the subject by different authors to contribute to ideas and 
suggestions to develop the topic. A questionnaire was carried out by making inquiries of the 
ports clients in order to support research findings through contacting most shipping lines and 
consignees.    
1.7  SCOPE OF THE STUDY 
The study is presented in five main chapters as follows:  
Chapter 1 – Introduction: This chapter gives an overview of the whole research. It 
describes the background, structure of the study, and identifies the main research 
objectives and methodology.  
Chapter 2 – Literature review: In this chapter, the author will survey previous studies in 
two main groups. One concerns port competition and other issues related to port 
efficiency.  
Chapter 3 – Methodology of Measuring Efficiency of UQP will be presented in chapter 
3 through questionnaire survey. It deals with several questions: which are given to users 
of UQP.  
Chapter 4– This chapter analyses UQP through applying the KPI analysis to support the 
outcomes in the questionnaire methodology by assessing the situation of port operation 
and the time in port of vessels for attracting vessels and shipping lines to the port 
through the requirement of competitive advantage and minimizing time at the port.  
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Chapter 5 –This chapter arranges for a conclusion concerning the level of 
competitiveness in existing port services in UQP according to this research in terms of 
cost effectiveness, and time saving. Some recommendations will be given for developing 
UQP in order to make the port competitive to increase its productivity and throughput.   
The discussion and analysis in this research will be based on the author’s previous 
experience as an employee at the UQP, contacts with port users and clients, data 
available about rival ports, relevant reference books, articles, magazines, field trips and 
lectures on port performance, management and logistics from World Maritime 
University.     
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2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1  PORT COMPETITION AND COMPETITIVENESS 
Prof. Willy Winkelmans, (2003) stated that “The final aim of port competition is indeed 
not just getting more traffic, more tonnage, etc., but achieving a sustainable degree of 
generating added values in relation to the input and effort.” 
In this regard, it is necessary to understand basically the main idea that drives port 
competition and the factors that make the port more effective in terms of competition. A 
further question is can the port be managed in a good way with less time to achieve 
profits and avoid losing clients. Strong management is essential to overcome the 
problems or weaknesses in a port as results of the nature of the maritime sector as a 
competitive environment which becomes more challenging as global trade becomes 
more intensive, according to increase in freight volumes, and container traffic. 
Development of port facilities and the quality of services is needed to attract clients and 
transform threats into opportunities. 
According to (UNCTAD, 1995, p. 4), “In an Asian port in 1992, 458 containers were 
handled in 3 ¼ hours and the vessel stayed at berth for less than half a day, while in 
another port in the region, the same number of containers required a vessel to spend 2 to 
3 days in the port.” 
Alderton (2005, p. 17) in his book Port Management and Operations stated that “Ports, 
like most other commercial activities, are constantly changing. Their design and 
infrastructure change as the vehicles using them change and their functions develop and 
alter as the trade passing through them varies in type and quantity.” 
Therefore, the Iraqi government started to develop the port facilities through the 
National Development Strategy (NDS) in October 2004 at the Tokyo Conference and 
the reconstruction strategy for the Transportation Sector was given highest priority 
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among other urgent infrastructure development projects in Iraq. In particular, the 
restoration projects of the UQP and KZP followed by the Iraq Port Sector Rehabilitation 
Project Phase 1 for the UQP by Japan, Official Development Assistant (ODA), in 2009-
2012 the JICA projects and other contributions in particular DANIDA  from the Danish 
government, which donated 2 million dollars, are all cooperating developing UQP 
facilities.  
Furthermore, it is important to mention that before 2003 Iraqi ports were underutilized 
without any solution to solve this problem. It is obvious that Iraq has lived through 
several wars as well as having a dictatorial regime that did not care or listen to the 
technical people and qualified staff or pay attention to developments in other countries. 
As an example, Iraq did not send students to WMU or any International education 
institution until 2003. Even then, the students have been sponsored exclusively by 
donors. This situation has resulted in a lack of competitive culture in addition to the 
negative impact of these wars.  
Focusing on the period after 2003 as the beginning of the return of Iraqi ports to the 
international maritime community is the first step to develop the Iraqi ports, in particular 
UQP. The Iraqi government developed a good strategy plans for the development of the 
ports, giving urgency to UQP in association with the JICA project and other 
contributions by the International Bank and Iraqi friend countries like Denmark  to 
develop and improve UQP’s performance. 
However, in spite of these projects to develop the UQP and other Iraqi ports by 
government and several associations, the problem is still there similar to the case of 
ports in the Eastern Caribbean States that developed by the Canadian International 
Development Agency (CIDA) as mentioned in section  2.4. 
As a result, the UQP should be studied and necessary changes identified in order to stay 
in line with its competitors as a first step. UQP could be a more effective and efficient 
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port when it is changed with development of its facilities to satisfy the customers and cut 
the cost of time. 
2.2  USER’S PERSPECTIVES  
The concept of PUC, ‘port user cost’ is the most important issue concerning the users of 
the port, and is considered the main reason that determines the port as attractive or not.  
It can be illustrated through a basic example when a vessel is berthing at a port; there are 
huge costs according to the time at the port as detailed in Table (3).  For instance, the 
cost of the time is calculated according to the price of the vessel divided by the useful 
life of the vessel times the number of days in the year and number of hours in the day to 
result in the sum of money the owner will lose. Furthermore, to calculate for charterer 
vessel, what the cost of a day in port will be, divide the freight rate per day by the 
number of hours in a day to get the sum of the money that the charterer will spend in one 
day as well as the demurrage that charterer has to pay to the owner in case the ship is 
delayed on the agreed and acceptable laytime days. 
Berth occupancy which is defined as the total time of vessels at berth divided by total 
berth hours available is considering as an indicator of port performance. High berth 
occupancy is not preferable to users of the port as it costs more than they expect as well 
as it means there is congestion in the port. On the other hand, low occupancy in the berth 
means the port has an underutilization problem. Therefore, connecting with 
recommended utilisation by UNCTAD to be 65 to 70% care should be taken to render 
efficient service for all facilities in the port with regard to the berth occupancy in relation 
with cost per day at the port. See Table (3) that cited by Mkango (Mkango, 1997). 
However, the berth occupancy depends on the main characteristics of the berths and 
vessels coming to the port in terms of type and size.  
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Table 3 Typical Ship Costs 
Vessel Classification Optional Berth 
Occupancy 
Cost per day at port 
General Cargo Vessels 65-75% US$ 8.000 
Bulk Carriers 35% US$ 15.000 
Container Vessel 50-55% US$ 30.000 
Oil Tankers 30% US$ 45.000 
Source: IPP III (1997)-WMU 
According to the Table above UQP has a high cost for the users as there is a long 
berthing time there, about 6.5 to 12.5 days on average, from 2005 to 2013, (see 
section  4.4.6 ). Furthermore, taking into account the type of vessels received by the port 
of UQP that is general cargo vessels and bulk carriers as well as container vessels within 
6 berths, to be highly sensitive with cost considerations requires great care to provide 
good facilities as a first stage by port management to solve this problem related to the 
time in port of a vessel to increase the efficiency to be a competitive port. The shorter 
time of the vessel in a port, the lower the cost will be and the more efficient the port will 
be from the user point of view.  
2.3  TIME IN PORT (TURNAROUND TIME) 
Drake Education Association, (UNCTAD, 1982, p. 18) stated that ship turnround Time 
is the total time spent by a particular vessel in port. Also it is defined in another sense as 
the average time spent in port by all vessels calling in a specific period. Then they are 
divided into two components namely, the Waiting Time and Ship’s Time at Berth.  
The time in the port is not only an essential factor to clients but also to the port as the 
most important element to reduce or increase port competitiveness, which should be 
observed all the time in port operations. Several Authors as well as the UNCTAD have 
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given a strong interest to this issue as they believed that the time at port is the most 
important factor to develop the port and to achieve profits to all parties concerned in 
business in the port sector.  
Drake Educational Associates (UNCTAD, 1982, pp. 18, Unite2) stated that:  
Ship Turnaround Time gives an excellent indication of the speed of service being 
provided to ship operators; it is a very important element in determining maritime 
costs. Moreover, the berth utilization is really measures of how the intensively berth 
facilities and resources are used in order to think that a high Berth Occupancy value 
is desirable and that indicates high berth efficiency which advised within the range 
60% to 70% as a safe berth occupancy value. 
Therefore, the time in port of a vessel is one of the main indicators used to measure the 
quality of services in the port. It is calculated by the time a vessel arrives at the port to 
the time it leaves that port at last buoy of the channel at pilot station. It involves a 
waiting time; a maneuvering time; Berthing time or service time including the 
Productivity time. According to lecture Handouts by Professor Moon (2013) the above 
activities can be seen clearly in Figure 4:  
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  Figure 4 Time in Port 
   
Source: Professor Daniel Moon, Handout 2013 
(Moon, Port Performance Indicators (PPI). Unpublished Lecture Handouts , 2013) 
Thus, analyzing the time of the vessel at the port to measure port performance is 
essential to present a good service in the port to be able to compete with other ports and 
increase efficiency and competitiveness. 
2.4  PORT SERVICE FACILITIES   
“High costs, poor services and low efficiency and productivity are symptoms of the 
problem rather than the causes. When there are problems in the port, the infrastructure 
and the cargo-handling equipment are often first considered to be at fault.” (UNCTAD, 
1995, p. 5) 
UNCTAD held a seminar on port operations in Basrah (Iraq) from 5 to15 November 
1979, Systematic Methods for Increasing Throughput and Reducing Ship Turn Round 
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time, to optimize transport and cargo handling operations in ports and their hinterland. 
They found that once the bottlenecks to higher berth throughput have been located, there 
are basically two ways in which the berth throughput capacity can be increased, either 
by improving the operations methods or by investment in new facilities which lead to a 
direct financial gain to the port and its users. They came up with methods of optimizing 
transport and cargo handling operations in ports and their hinterland, to minimize cost in 
real terms, to contribute to the growth of the national economy. 
However, Ports beyond the phenomenon of facilities and service, in terms of the 
importance, port competition exceeds the pure fact of having good facilities. Port 
competition means that the success of a port no longer depends totally on its own 
facilities. For example, in the 1970’s, in spite of  the Canadian International 
Development Agency is contribution to port development (CIDA) in most of the Eastern 
Caribbean States by financing infrastructure, superstructure and equipment, the ports in 
this region still experienced difficulties and the problems were not solved. Then, 
Novaport Limited, a port consultancy firm was engaged by CIDA to manage the project 
and provide the technical assistance and training services. They found that the assistance 
provided by CIDA to four Caribbean ports confirmed that significant improvement to 
the ports’ productivity and financial situation could be achieved at relatively low cost. 
As a result of these improvements , the ports which appeared to operate at maximum 
capacity at the start of projects, have been able to handle 50% increase in traffic 9 years 
later without building any new infrastructure and have not yet reached their saturation 
point. And they said, the better utilization of the existing facilities can be attributed to 
the introduction of modern cargo handling systems, training staff and the introduction of 
a limited amount of equipment to facilitate the handling of containers, which had been 
contemplated when the ports were designed and built. However, they found the project 
did not succeed in removing all the government interference in day by day management 
of the ports.  (CIDA, 1992, pp. 2.1 , 2.8 and 2.9). 
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Furthermore, in 1989 the UNCTAD survey in ports of four African countries namely, 
Côte d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Kenya and Senegal as the investment in modern port found that 
the real causes of the problems of under-utilisation were institutional rather than 
established the modern facilities as the interface between the government and the port 
was too heavy and therefore these ports were very cost to clients.  (UNCTAD, 1995, p. 
5) 
Therefore, the most important issue that has to be understood by the GCPI is to 
determine the challenges that UQP has to deal with to improve its performance and 
achieve effective and efficient work to satisfy its clients.  One of the challenges, that all 
parts of the port operation face are related to the time cost of users. 
2.5  GEOGRAPHICAL LOCATION 
From cargo owners’ point of view, Port Location is the most important factor in terms of 
the total costs. The port that would add some miles to their routes will be excluded. 
Therefore, comparing to UQP’s location, the shipping line calculate the distance of 
neighbouring ports to the trade routes to find which one is more efficient to their 
business.  Therefore, the port location should be taken into account when the port 
management assesses the competitiveness of a port.  
In spite of economic and social benefits of the flow of goods across the border, it 
represents a threat to the productivity of the port when the shipping lines use the 
hinterland connecting Iraq's border with its neighbouring ports.  
However, one of the technical reasons as a major factor affecting the demand of 
maritime transport according to (Ma, 2012, p. 34) is the Land Bridge that can be a 
terrible threat to maritime transport, especially those across the Euro-Asia continent. 
Once the political and technical difficulties are overcome in some of countries of 
transit, the land bridge (a railway link between coasts) alternative will become 
serious competition to the maritime transport option. This is because the total transit 
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time can be reduced by more than 30% while the cost can be kept at almost the same 
level or even cheaper compared with the sea alternative. The same situation, to a 
different extent of course, may happen in other continents such as South America or 
Africa once the land transport system has been improved. 
As a result, it is imperative that the UQP be concerned about long turnaround time of 
vessels at the port by taking practical steps to minimize the time with high priority on 
the port facilities to achieve good services, as there are challenges by other ports that 
could attract users of the port through border crossings.   
2.6  REGIONAL BORDER CROSSINGS 
The UQP has faced sensitive competition from neighbouring ports through the border 
crossings that have a negative impact on its productivity and throughput. However, the 
port has a competitive advantage on its rivals as the UQP is close to the market 
compared with transportation distances from these ports to the Iraqi market. The 
shipping lines and cargo owners are concerned about total cost which should be taken in 
account in UQP management.  
2.6.1    MAJOR ROUTES TO IRAQ 
Iraq with its neighbouring countries is connected through the infrastructure of 
surrounding land that allows cargo and people have exchanged easily among them. 
There are several corridors between these countries as follow: 
2.6.1.1 THE SYRIA AND TURKISH CORRIDORS 
From the Mersin port in Turkey and the Tartous and Latakia ports in Syria, cargo is 
transported through this route to the north of Iraq. From the Turkish ports of Mersin at 
the Mediterranean Sea, with short transit times to/from Europe, cargo is transported 
overland via the Turkish-Iraqi border point Zakho to northern cities and also to central 
Iraqi destinations. Mersin port is located approximately 1, 400 km away from Baghdad.  
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2.6.1.2   ROUTE OF THE AQABA PORT IN JORDAN 
From the Aqaba port in Jordan to the north of Baghdad, it is approximately 1,500km, 
through the Jordan-Iraq border point Trebil.  From all European main ports to Aqaba 
port and vice versa, there are regular shipments that make this route one of the most 
important in International Maritime Trade. Moreover, this route is used to transport 
cargo overland from ports in Syria and Turkey. 
2.6.1.3 ROUTE OF THE PORTS IN IRAQ  
Form the ports in Basrah, in the south of Iraq, namely Umm Qasr, Khor Az Zubayr, Abu 
Flus and Al Maqil Ports, the cargo is imported to Iraq, and in particular to  eight city 
regions. However, some of these cities depend on the Aqaba port in Jordan and the ports 
in Kuwait and Iran to import their cargo. Kuwaiti ports are approximately 700km away 
from Baghdad and only approximately 200km away from Basrah and, roughly, the case 
is the same with Iranian ports in Khorramshahr and Bandar-e Emam Khomeyni ports as 
closer neighbouring ports to South and Central Iraq. Table (4) shows the distances from 
the neighbouring ports to Basrah and Baghdad, the main cities in Iraq.  
Table 4 Distances from neighbouring Ports to Iraq  
Port Basrah Baghdad Iraqi-neighbouring border Border point 
UQP 70km 600km - - 
Shuwaikh-Kuwait 200km 700km 120km Safwoan 
Aqaba-Jordan 2000km 1,500km 870Km Trebil 
Mersin-Turkey 1900km 1, 400 km 950 Zakho 
Source:  Author 
Based on Japan International Cooperation Agency Study 2002 (JICA, 2012), Figure 5 
shows the imported cargo through these corridors and routes. 
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          Figure 5 Imported Cargo Transport Routes to Iraq 
 
Source: The study for Development of Southern Port in Iraqi Cited by (JICA, 2012) 
Interim Report, Data Collection Survey on Port Development Plan in Iraq 
An interview survey done (JICA, 2012) in 2009 through a Consultant Committee in 
charge of the Port Rehabilitation Project Phase 1 stated that with truck transport 
companies who are handling cargoes transported by trucks to Iraq from ports of 
neighboring countries an approximately 60% of the total imported cargoes has been 
transported from Route 2 (the Aqaba port in Jordan) to Iraq, 30 % was from ports of the 
northern and western corridors in Turkey and Syria, and an only around 10 % of the total 
imported cargoes was through the UQP and KZP ports in the southern region of Iraq. 
Minimizing the time of the vessel in UQP, to avoid above situation, by presenting a 
good service and improving the facilities in the port is the major aim of the Iraqi 
government and the GCPI. 
Furthermore, the problems of inadequate facilities, limitations of channel in its draft to 
receive bigger vessels to serve the shipping lines, as they are concerned about economies 
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of scale, involve many difficulties causing the port to be less effective with high costs to 
the users. 
2.7  MANAGERIAL DIFFICULTIES 
Excessive interference by the government in internal and external affairs is causing 
many problems to the port. The activities that need to be done immediately for the work 
to succeed do not work with the government bureaucratic system, which makes for long 
procedures in Iraqi ports. For example, when equipment should be replaced as the work 
changes are required; it takes a long time to obtain approval to start. From the middle 
manager, Board Director then ministry agreement which will give an advantage to the 
competitors of the port.   
A lack of decision making in the port is a problem affecting competitive advantage as a 
result of deficiency of management information system and other relevant technologies. 
There is no way managers can give incentives to encourage the users when they increase 
their calls due to lack of IT services in the port. 
In addition, there is no analytical information with regards to operational activities to 
evaluate the situation of port, such as the bottlenecks, and use results to enhance the port 
performance. Another threat to port managers for taking decisions is the conflict of 
authorities within port premises and operations. For instance, the navigation manager 
and dredging manager who are serving port activities follow another authority, which is 
not located at the port.  
The lack of sustainable strategy planning for marketing evolution, the use of information 
and for training programs at all levels of the port staff is problematic and precludes 
phased advancement of sustainable development of good management. This policy 
should be associated with the mission’s overall strategy to progressively transfer 
functional port responsibilities to selected qualified staff. 
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“Strategic planning is the managerial process of developing and maintaining a strategic 
direction that aligns the organizations’ goals and resources with its changing market 
opportunities… In order a company to remain strong in a competitive environment its 
should carry out strategic planning” (Visvikis, 2013) 
Furthermore, the GCPI as a part of the Iraqi Government institutions, in the days of 
election, would get additional stuff as a campaign for the party that is responsible for 
this ministry, in our case, the transport ministry. The new staff has no qualifications, no 
job to do, and they are untrained, causing overstaffing problems as well as creating a 
morale considerations for those who work hard with little difference in wages compared 
with this new staff. Unfortunately, the situation has been repeating every election 
campaign. The situation is clear when looking at Table (5) within three election times, 
2004, 2008 and 2012 as well as the temporary government for one year after 2003. 
Table 5 GCPI staff numbers from 2005 to 2013 
Years Number of Staff Notes 
2003 7400 Additional stuff has joined to Iraqi ports under 
order of the transport minister’s authority. 2005 8600 
2010 9325 
2013 12400 
Source: GCPI, human resource department (personal communication)   
2.8  OPERATIONAL DIFFICULTIES  
Another serious challenge is with navigational control and Berthing control as well as 
the connectivity of the berths in port with national hinterland to make the goods flow 
smoothly. Smooth flow of goods is essential to the port of improvement performance 
and competitiveness. Channel capacity with inappropriate depths, unreliable aids to 
navigation and poor berth service, as there are several failures with cargo gears, are key 
factors for the vessels to delay and prolong their time in the port.  
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All these above reasons make the UQP an expensive port. As they are dissatisfied with 
cost and inadequacy of the service according to the above factors, the cargo owners and 
shipping lines have been enforced to use alternative ways to transport their cargo 
overland as the total cost requires a high care for a whole supply chain system. 
It can be inferred from above that competitiveness depends on a multitude of elements 
used to achieve the port competitive advantage(s) among other competitors to be able to 
attract clients, whereas the port should determine the problem causing the delay and not 
give competitors opportunities to attract the clients. 
In conclusion, studying all these above mentioned issues is necessary to solve the 
problem in order to make the port operate efficiently and to be competitive. However, 
focusing on the time in the port of a vessel is one of the most important indicators to 
measure the quality of services in the port. Furthermore, there are limitations due to time 
and availability of the data which it make impossible to cover all the issues mentioned 
above. 
The questionnaire methodology as well as the KPI analysis is used in order to identify 
the problems and constraints that prolong the time of vessels in port. A questionnaire is 
carried out by preparing inquiries to port users, and is supported through contact with 
shipping lines and consignees.     
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3  QUESTIONNAIRE SURVEY ON UQP OPERATIONS 
  
Port operation is classified by Frankel (1987) into “Waterfront Operations and Land 
Operations. Waterfront Operations comprise navigational control, accommodation of 
ships and floating equipment, loading and unloading of vessels, servicing of ships, 
maintenance of ships, and marine operation administration.” 
On the other hand he stated that “the Land Operations including cargo storage and cargo 
processing interfacing transportation modes, and short term accommodation and 
administration of passengers” (Frankel, 1987, p. 495) 
Questionnaire as a quantitative research method is used to describe and analyze 
responses on the basis of questioning of a proportion of a particular population to 
measure performance of port operations, in this case in UQP, through the users of the 
port.  
32 questionnaires were distributed among the users of the port to involve the shipping 
lines and agents,  based on the same style of questionnaire on Dar-Es-Salaam Port that 
created by Mkango (1997) with some addition of some items which are related to the 
topic. An excel sheets and diagrams were made accordingly.  
The response rate was 63%. The figures of questionnaire-respondent results are 
organized on an excel sheet as shown in Appendix (2) to calculate the percentage of the 
trend of the performance in the port and measure how efficient the port is. Moreover, 
several phone calls with agents of UQP were made by the author in order to understand 
the problems related to the time at the port. Although, they mentioned many issues that 
hindering the speed of handling and corruption, the author is focusing on the areas 
related to the topic in order to reach satisfactory results of this study. 
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Evaluation of Safety of Navigation in the Port is the first question to the shipping lines 
and agents, which draw a very clear impression of dissatisfaction with a high proportion 
of poor and very poor assessments. A specific comment was made that new tugs and 
pilot boats are required. Results are shown in the Figure (6). 
Figure 6 Navigational Channel Assessments 
Source: Questionnaire Respondent Results, Appendix 2 
Availability of facilities is the second topic of assessment, which resulted in a variety of 
responses including with poor and very poor response to availability of tug boats and 
pilot vessels services as well as the draft depth. Comments show that there is a demand 
for the Channel and berth to be dredged to reach the max 15 m draft. Figure (7) shows 
the poor situation in the port.   
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Figure 7 Availability of Facilities   
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Source: Questionnaire Respondent Results, Appendix 2 
Stevedores Performance and Conduct is the third issue presented to the users with high a 
number of results in bad and very bad performance in the port although there is a little 
bit of dissatisfaction with the discipline of the stevedores. In addition, they had 
Comments that Laborer and Crane operators are not qualified and have no valid 
certificates or licenses. Figure (8) shows the case of stevedore performance and conduct. 
Figure 8 Stevedores Performance and Conduct 
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As mentioned in section  2.3, time in port of a vessel needs be broken down according to 
port activities as shown in the Figure (4). Moreover, studying the existing facilities in 
UQP, which are doing these activities as part of port operations will give a better 
understanding for analysis of arrival and departure vessels according to the questionnaire 
respondent results to determine at which stage the port has a problem to solve, and give 
a solution to minimize the time in the port as much as possible to achieve differentiation 
and efficiency for the port. 
Port operations involve several activities which can be divided into land activities and 
waterfront activities as classified by Frankel (1987). In line with the purpose of this 
paper, the author will concentrate on the activities that influence the total turnaround 
time in port of a ship to classify them into two parts namely, Navigation Control, Berth 
Control as related to the UQP facilities and connectivity to the hinterland.  
3.1  NAVIGATION CONTROL  
The vessel will undertake several stages in its passage from the point where it passes the 
sea (EOSP) to enter territorial Iraqi waters with the sea pilot into Khor Abdullah channel 
to UQP, to be received finally by the harbour pilot to do operation of berthing with tug 
boats.  
3.1.1 WAITING AREA 
The waiting area is located at the end of the channel of Khor Abdullah buoy # 1 next to 
Al-Basrah Oil Terminal 4 Miles away as shown in Figure 9. It extends from buoy # 1 
and is 10 miles long and 4 Miles wide. This anchorage area receives all the vessels 
coming to UQP as well as other Iraqi ports. The pilot vessel is anchored at buoy #1 at 
the end of this channel, and it takes an average time of about half to one hour for the 
pilot to reach the vessel where it is anchored to wait its turn.  
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In poor weather conditions, the pilot vessel anchors away from the waiting area to force 
the UQP calling vessel entering the channel to come to buoy #1 or even buoy # 7, 
causing risk and some delay in its passage when it stops again to pick up the pilot, rather 
than the pilot embarking where the vessel anchors in the waiting area. 
Furthermore, the pilot vessel is an old one, built in 1970, and experiences many 
difficulties. It breaks down many times and has to be replaced by a tug boat coming 
from UQP through the 50 mile channel of Khor Abdulla to reach the waiting area, which 
takes an average time of about 5 to 6 hours .   
Therefore, there is dissatisfaction with the pilot station vessel in the questionnaire 
survey, which recorded responses of availability of facilities as a poor (41.2%), as 
shown in Figure 7 and poor performance (47.1%), as shown in Figure 6. 
Moreover, another source of delay for dry, bagging, cement, equipment carriers and 
general cargo vessels is that they are required to have samples taken to be checked at 
Iraqi labs, and to receive the analysis result takes a long time. 
Furthermore, according to UQP management as told to the author, the Iraqi Government 
has signed agreements with a number of international cargo inspection companies to 
take samples of cargo before they arrive at port, but the cargo receiver requires another 
inspection of the cargo which results in vessels waiting at the anchorage area to achieve 
another delay, increasing the total time and the waiting time in particular. 
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Figure 9 UQP Anchorage Area  
 
Source: HIS by AIS Live, (Traffic.Com, Live Map, 2013) 
http://www.marinetraffic.com/ais/shipdetails.aspx  
3.1.2 COMMUNICATIONS  
UQP Radio coast station is an active unit at the port which connects all ships arriving to 
the port for 24 hours. However, this station is working at the minimum with outdated 
equipment. This station is the unit that has a data base on Excel for all vessels calling the 
port but at the minimum of discrete data under personal skills while the management 
office does not have any data base about its activities and still keeps paper records. 
Moreover, the pilot vessel at the entrance to the channel has a person belonging to this 
unit to transmit information related to the arrival of vessels and to coordinate the work. 
Therefore, in the evaluation of Safety of Navigation, the Coast Station received a 52.9% 
satisfactory response in the questionnaire results (see Figure 6). 
3.1.3 PILOTAGE SERVICE 
Pilotage is mandatory for UQP and, if required, is also conducted at night. The first step 
is to allow the vessel to enter UQP; it must take permission from the Director of the 
Port. The ship’s name, flag, IMO number, GRT, LOA, Draft, ETA, its location, course 
and speed should be sent by the local agents to the Director of the Port by Fax, not less 
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than 24 hours before the vessel enters Khor Abdullah’s waters. The report should be also 
made on the VHF channel appropriate to the intended point of entry when the vessel 
approaches to the port. When the vessel arrives, within 24 hours, its owner, local agent 
or master should submit the documents to the Port Office (PO). However, all these data 
are recorded in an old style by using paper documentation not IT system. 
Pilotage service in UQP is a part of service for all ports. This unit is at the centre of the 
GCPI building responsible for providing pilots to the vessels by pilot vessel at buoy 
number 1 at the entrance of the Khor Abdullah channel, which connect to UQP and 
other ports. There are always 8 pilots, at least, available in pilot vessel to receive the 
arriving vessels while the unit in the centre of GCPI provides pilots for the departure 
vessels. Pilots board the vessels near buoy 1 at the Khor Abdullah channel entrance to 
lead them to UQP and vice versa. It is fair to find by the questionnaire survey a 41.2% a 
satisfactory rating and 47.1% good rating on availability of pilots. However, there is 
dissatisfaction with the pilot station vessel in the questionnaire survey, as mentioned in 
section  3.1.1. 
3.1.4 LIGHT AND BUOY SERVICE 
Light and buoy service is a unit responsible for all activities relating to installing and 
maintaining the lighting buoys in all Iraqi channels and ports. However, the war 
damaged all its equipment and crane vessels belong to this unit except a Nasser salvage 
vessel that was renewed by DANIDA in 2006 under donation of Danish Government. In 
spite of this good project by DANIDA, many of buoys still experience problems related 
to blackouts and go missing from channel as the unit has other missions to do as well to 
extend to three channels namely, Khor Al Kafka, Shatt al-Arab or al-faw channel and 
Khor Abdullah channel, the UQP access channel to UQP and KZP as well, resulting in 
vessels having difficulties in dealing with traffic efficiency. As a result, the 
questionnaire survey found responses to lighting systems varied according to the 
performance of the Nasser vessels among the channels, as shown in (Figure 6).  
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3.1.5 CHANNEL DEPTH SERVICE 
There is a big unit responsible for maintaining and saving the depth of the channel at an 
announced draft by GCPI for receiving ships calling in UQP and other Iraqi ports. It is 
connected with GCPI away from UQP management. Except to provide simple 
information to the harbour master or UQP managers, the dredging manager has no 
responsibility to give real data to UQP management as the structure of the GCPI was 
organized in the beginning of the foundation of the port. The situation is the same with 
navigational, tug, lighting and salvage services as the management of the port is 
separated away from these services to keep within the GCPI responsibility.  
There is a draft limitation in the approach channel, 50 nautical miles from buoy 1 to 
UQP with a width of 200m during low water tide, ranging from 7-10m. Therefore, the 
GCPI has equipped this unit with multi-drudgers to maintain the average depths at 
12.5m. 
However, this unit was the GCPI unit that lost-the most equipment and vessels during 
the wars when most of the dredgers were sinking and breaking down. Therefore, the 
accumulated sedimentations cause a negative impact on the port where the volume and 
size of the vessels at the port would therefore be declined. The shortage of the dredger 
vessels leads to irregular dredging, which is considered a major constraint for the future 
arrival of bigger ships and, therefore, hinders the competitiveness of UQP.  
Therefore, by 2012 the permissible draft was reduced per order of the GCPI to less than 
12.5m. However, due to a loan by the Japanese Government, the channel was dredged 
and deepened again to 12.5m along all berths after 2012 through contract with a Belgian 
company called Marine Belgium's Jan De Nul Group. It is one of three contracts entered 
into the GCPI with a value of 70 million dollars and a corresponding value of the others 
of 40 million and 35 million dollars after 2003. But, in spite of these efforts the tidal 
range is vulnerable to sedimentation, as a result of sediments from the north Arabian 
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Gulf, estimated by center of sea science in Basrah University to amount to about 1.8 
million metric tons yearly.  
Figure (10) shows fluctuations of dredging for mud loads monthly which support the 
questionnaire results related to draft depth availability (Figure 7). Those fluctuations are 
due to many break downs of the dredgers as a result of lack of spare parts which should 
be provided by technical and financial committees.  It takes a long time when they 
provide the materials needed to repair the dredger vessels as well as the last month of the 
year is the end of the accounting fiscal year for annual report where the Auditors’ Report 
gives the financial situation of the company in accordance with acceptable accounting 
principles. However, the old style that used in the GCPI related to the management 
information system done on paper that took much time to fulfill its work.  
Figure 10 Monthly Mud loads carried by dredgers in 2010 
 
Source: Dredging Unit statistics, Appendix 3 
According to the questionnaire survey the most complained about issues are the berth 
draft as well as the access channel related to the problem of sedimentation in UQP and, 
in particular UQPN, as a manmade river, causing delay of improvement of draft in the 
channel even though the port recently bought modern dredgers to enhance their 
equipment. About 64.7 % of respondent on shipping lines and agent questionnaire 
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recorded as poor, depths of the channel, see (Figure 6) and 47.1% reported poor draft 
depth availability of the channel (Figure 7).  
The results trend toward the satisfaction of users when the port has improvements 
number of dredger vessels affected by the break downs due to the shortage in the spare 
parts. In addition, the satisfaction is reached in bringing the bigger vessels when the port 
uses a private company to dredge the channel and fronts of the berths. However, this 
situation is not prolonged any more as sedimentation is carried out every day into the 
channel and the port. 
3.1.6 BERTHING AND UNBERTHING SERVICE 
This service involves the received vessels at the harbour limit by the harbour pilot to do 
operations of berthing and unberthing. There is a unit responsible for these operations 
which provides harbour pilots and organizes the movement of tugs and mooring 
services. There is no problem with preparing the mooring team who are ready all the 
times to tie up the vessels along the berth with two shifts weekly. Therefore 64.7% and 
11.8% of respondents reported good and very good evaluation of service, respectively.  
Reaching the harbour pilots to the vessels is very easy as a small boat or any tug boat 
can pick up the pilot while the port is a river port and the limit of the harbour where the 
harbour pilot embarks is not more than one mile away. Eventually,  the harbour pilot 
hands out the vessel to a sea pilot to direct her to sea through the access channel at buoy 
# 1 along 50 miles away from the port and vice versa. However, the problem is with the 
tugs, experiencing too many difficulties, as there is a shortage of tugs as well as a lack of 
most spare parts and regular maintenance.  
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3.1.7 TUG BOAT SERVICE 
The tug boat service is the most important in the manoeuvering operations, in and out 
which are in connection with the harbour pilot at all times. To complete the operation of 
berthing or unberthing safely there should be at least 2 tugs as the current speed is very 
high, in particular at UQPS. However, the port is suffering from this point as its tugs are 
old and encounter several failures each day. As well as most of them were lost by the 
war events. As such, tugs are frequently unavailable when a vessel comes to the port. 
Therefore, the shipping lines and their agencies stated that there is a requirement for new 
tugs and pilot boats as a result of the poor (70.6%) rating given to Tugging Services, 
(see Figure 6). Furthermore, 47.1% they reported poor tug boats availability (see Figure 
7).   
3.2  BERTH CONTROL 
This part involves the operation of handling of cargo from the time of sending the first 
line of the ship to tie it to its berth and includes, in some cases, sampling of cargo, if it is 
not done in anchorage area and cargo custom clearance procedures, until the vessel 
leaves the berth. Therefore, it is better to understand the existing facilities in the UQP 
and the other operations related to this stage to determine the constraints that are causing 
delays and affecting the time in port in positive or negative ways in order to give the 
appropriate solutions and make the operations go smoothly.  
3.2.1 UQP FACILITIES 
The facilities are found on the river at the end of Khor Abdullah channel and an 
excavated tributary arm towards the northwest of Umm Qasr area south of Basrah city. 
The facility is 5.2km long and consists of 22 berths and 2 Ro/Ro-berths including the 
South port (UQPS) and the north port (UQPN). The total berth length of UQPS is about 
1900 meters  and the UQPN is about 2173 m long,  including the new berth which is 
200m long, for Ro/Ro & Passengers, built separately in 2010 as well as 2 berths recently 
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added, under names 11 a and 11 b at the area near berth 11. Berth depths are 10 to 12.5 
m. UQP handles multi-purpose and container cargo. 
The port is equipped with 6 gantry cranes, 4 mobile cranes in container berths and quay 
cranes and other equipment which is detailed in Tables (6 & 7) UQPS and UQPN 
Facilities; however, in the multi-purpose berth they still use vessel cranes. 
Figure 11 UQP Layout 
 
Source: (JICA, 2012)  
Interim Report, Data Collection Survey on Port Development Plan in Iraq 
Two areas make up the port, namely, the UQPN and the UQPS. UQPS, the south port 
area is located along the Navigational Channel. UQPN, the north port area continues 
inside a widened and dredged man-made basin off the Navigational Channel and is 
located northwest of the south port. They are handling containers, general cargo, grain 
and other bulk as well as sugar and vegetable oil. The UQP recently comprises of a 
container terminal (ICT) at area nearby berth 11 as there is space between berth 11 in 
UQPS and berth 12 in UQPN to give a more space for receiving more vessels. These are 
named berth 11a and berth 11b and are equipped with 2 second hand Mitsubishi STS 
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gantry cranes. The ICT, a new expansion by GCPI that has operated under concession 
on 31 Aug of 2012 by Gulftainer Inc., which has already been operating berth no. 8 in 
UQPS.   
Table 6 UQPS Facilities 
Port Bert
h 
Commodities  Annual 
Capacit
y x1000 
N. Crane Dimension
s 
Draft Notes 
UQP
S 
1 - 250 - (201*25)m 12 Iraq Navy 
2-3 Dry bulk, 
break bulk 
and sulphur 
import  
500 tons 2Jeep QCs   
(400*25)m 
  
4 Containers 
and multi-
purpose for 
container and 
general cargo 
handling 
500 tons Using ships’ 
Cranes for 
handling of 
containers 
 
(200*25)m 
12m French 
shipping 
company 
(CMA-CGM) 
uses under the 
concession. 
5 Container and 
break bulk  
 
100,000 
TEUs 
 
(2) of 
40tons 
Nelcon STS 
gantry C 
(250*35)m 
 
 
 
12.5
m 
Joint Venture 
Martrade/Gaz
al 
 
6-7 break bulk  500 tons QCs (350*20)m  11.8  
8 Container   100.000
TEUs 
 2 x 100t 
Harbour 
Mobil 
cranes- 
HMK280 
(210*24)m 11.8
m 
Concession 
for Gulftainer 
9 Location of a 
Turkish 
power vessel 
- - (168*25)m 
 
9m Engage by 
Turkish power 
vessel 
10 Grain 
Storage silo  
45,000m
3 tons  
- (280*30)m 12.5
m 
Grain 
 
11  Gasoline 250 tons - (200*25)m 11m Gasoline 
11a-
11b 
Container  
(ICT), Iraq 
Container 
Terminal 
1000 
tons 
Two Gantry 
Cranes 
Terminal 
area 
approx. 
300,000m² 
11m concession for 
Gulftainer 
The operation 
started 31 
Aug. 2012 
Source: UQP management  
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As shown in Table (6): berth # 1 is out of order through the navy force and lighting unit, 
which has been using it for military purposes since 2003. However, a part from this 
berth about 50- 75 m can be used when the harbour pilots need it.  
Berth # 5 is used for container handling by a joint venture of Martrade and Gazal, while 
berths no. 6 and 7 are used by the GCPI to handle break bulk and general cargo. In 2011, 
mostly services of Maersk, Wan Hai Lines and Seacon were served at berth no. 5, 
accounting for more than 100,000 TEUs. 
Table 7 UQPN Facilities 
Port Berth  Commodities Capacity N. Cranes Dimensions Draft Notes 
UQPN 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
12-19 General cargo, 
break bulk  
  
 
2000tons 
It means 
each one 
is equal 
250tons 
36 Q/C  
were 
installed in 
1980 but 
many of 
them  are not 
working 
 
12=188*25 9m old 
outdated 
sheds  
causing not 
feasible for 
container 
operations 
13=200*25 9m 
14=200*25 9.5m 
15=200*25 10m 
16=240*25 10m 
17=200*25 11m 
18=200*25 11m 
19=210*25 11.5m 
20-21 Container  
 
100.000 
TUEs 
(2)40tons 
ZPMC STS 
gantries  
(2) New 
Liebherr 
Harbour 
Mobile 
Cranes  
(535*35)m 
 
11.8m Storage 
yard is 
crossed by 
two rail 
lines 
Container 
storage 
yard 
22 Ro/Ro & 
Passengers 
250 tons - 200m*25 11.8m Vessel 
Turn round 
Location 
Source: UQP management 
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At UQPS, eight old and abandoned portal cranes are entirely out of order at berths no. 6 
and 7, and Several Q/C were installed in 1980 at the UQPN but many of them are not 
working and, therefore, need to be removed and scrapped in order to guarantee smooth 
ship-to-shore operations. 
According to Tables 8 and 9, At UQP, berths 4, 5, 8, 11 a, and 11 b are operated under 
concessions contracts and a joint venture of work. However, berths 1 and 9 are occupied 
by the Iraq Navy and a Turkish power vessel, which makes them out of the account of 
port operations. 
Privatization of the berths in the port is an effective way to develop the port facilities 
and services. However, this has a negative impact on the other berths under government 
performance, which are constrained by limited flexibility related to port activities, 
especially in buying essential equipment when they need it as well as the long 
bureaucratic formalities. 
Moreover, there are disadvantages against the UQP facilities as there is old equipment 
which needs to be renewed. Therefore, there is a high proportion of dissatisfaction with 
the Type of Equipment/Gear with 41.2% of respondents rating it poor. The availability 
of equipment and Cargo Gears also shows a clear poor trend (29.4%) as shown in Figure 
(12). 
Figure 12 Availability of Equipment and Cargo Gears 
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Source: Questionnaire Respondent Results, Appendix 2   
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Another source of the delay for the vessels at UQP is the poor performance stevedores, 
which appears obviously in the results of the questionnaire to record about 47.1% of 
respondent on the shipping lines and their agencies questionnaire, poor performance 
stevedores, and 64.7% reported poor driver performance as shown in (Figure 8). 
Furthermore, the shipping lines and their agencies stated that Labourers and Crane 
operators are not qualified and have no valid certificates or licenses.  
As a result, all these factors will have a strong effect on the work in the port to decrease 
the cargo handling productivity therefore, there is a need to renew this equipment along 
with JICA projects and the port should sign an agreement with a socializing stevedoring 
company for all cargo handling activities and making a good procedure to monitor their 
performances. 
3.2.2 HINTERLAND FROM SOUTH PORT (UQPS) 
UQP is linked to the national Iraqi road and railway network serving the main cities in 
Basrah and Baghdad, the capital of Iraq. The berths are accessed by truck via the main 
gate of UQP. Rail tracks connect the port via Shouaiba junction where the area is west of 
Basrah city.  However, the national Iraqi road and railway networks are very old and 
experienced several difficulties.   
3.2.3 HINTERLAND OF UQP FROM NORTH PORT (UQPN) 
The main gate at UQPN provides access to berth numbers 12 to 22. There is a gate 
belonging to these berths, but unfortunately it is out of order. 
At the end of the port facilities of Umm Qasr the berths number 20 and 21 are located 
with approximately 450 m, which amounts to a quay apron width of some 80 m to a 
36,000 m² concrete surfaced operational quay area. Two crane rails with a 30 m gauge 
are crossing along the berths. In addition the berths have access to the railway network, 
but the rails are not useful for operations as they are neglected and there are technical 
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issues related to Iraqi Railways Corporation. Container vessel approximately 2,100 TEU 
can be served at any time at the berths. They are operated by GCPI, equipped  with 2 
about 18 year old ZPMC STS gantry cranes, each with a capacity of 40tons.132,000m² 
of ground area is available, which consists of a 36,000m² operational quays and a 
96,000m² of yard storage area. However, with all these adequate storage spaces as the 
north and south port of Umm Qasr consist of 160,000m² and of 800,000m² of open 
storage area, there is still a problem to manage all the cargo and vessels. This is in line 
with dissatisfaction of the users of the UQP who record rating of a very poor 23.5 % and 
other fluctuated results can see in Figure 13: 
Figure 13 UQP Storage Area Assessment 
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The other important factors that will have a strong effect on port productivity, which are 
shown to have high dissatisfactory responses from the shipping lines and their agencies 
based on the questionnaire, are documentation, container inspection area for custom list 
preparation, and container loading list preparation to provide services in UQP Offices 
with poorly performance and more delay to them (See Figure 14 and table 8). These 
factors are called by Professor Ma as factors of production, which are the major driving 
the force for trade (Ma, 2012, p. 7). 
Figure 14 Observation of First in First served in providing service  
 
Source: Questionnaire Respondent Results, Appendix 2 
Table 8 Import Documentation Duration and Cargo Delivery 
ITEMS
Current Maximum Duration Taking 
Place within
(5) days (10) days (15) days
17.6 11.8 52.9
Minimum  Duration Taking Place within (3) days (5) days (5-8) days 
29.4 0.0 47.1
Ideal Duration for cargo delivery from 
Users’ point of view?
(3) days (2) days (1) days 
52.9 17.6 29.4
Period
 
Source: Questionnaire respondent results, Appendix 2  
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All these reasons mentioned above have contributed to make the UQP more expensive 
related to the time in the port which means the port management should implement 
appropriate methods to minimize this time as it is related to the total cost. 
Providing the port with appropriate equipment associated with dredging the channel is a 
good strategy to attract users in proportion to the amount of cargo handling related to the 
receiving the bigger vessels. 
In conclusion, it can be inferred from the illustrations above that UQP has many 
problems related to its facilities and procedures directly affecting the time at the port 
which need to be reformed and renew. Development under a planning strategy by GCPI 
is necessary to make the effective and efficient.  
The port performance indicators related to the time of a vessel at the port will be used in 
the next chapter as a profound analysis to support the results above to identify the 
efficiency and competitiveness level and the performance of UQP. 
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4 ANALISIS OF TIME-RELATED KPIs  
 
4.1  INTRODUCTION  
 “The major purpose for collecting information to maintain performance indicators is to 
provide management information for planning and control.” (UNCTAD, Port 
Performance Indicators, TD/B/C.4/131/Supp.1/Rev.1). 
In this section the author analyses the time in UQP of a vessel, using the characteristics 
of the vessels and pattern of arrival and departure times to assess the efficiency of UQP 
operation. By calculations of KPIs related to the time of vessel at port, starting with a 
case study of two important vessels that came to the port in 2011. Several stages of time 
from the vessel passing the sea (EOSP) to either dropping anchor in the waiting area to 
wait for its turn in queue or proceeding direct to its berth to do its cargo operations of 
loading or discharging until it returns back to this point are analyzed to determine the 
bottlenecks of the flow of the cargo according to the collected data from the UQP. 
Eventually, at the end of this chapter it is given an analysis implication on KPIs 
outcomes are giving. 
4.2 VESSELS’ CHARACTERISTICS  
In UQP, located on the end of Khor Abdullah channel, is the largest river port in South 
Basrah in Iraq, handling multi-purpose and container cargo. It is the life-blood for 
economic growth in Iraq as mentioned in section  1.2.2. Figure 15 shows the cargo 
handling in the port in three recent years (2010 to 2012) with an obvious upward trend, 
in particular the containers and the grains.   
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Figure 15 UQP handling per tons in 2010 to 2012 
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Source: UQP Statistics, vessels calling UQP, Appendix 4 
In spite of the increase in vessels in total Gross Tonnage (GT) of approximately +3.52% 
in 2010 to 2012, to handle 3,020 vessels with an average of 1,007 vessels yearly to carry 
about 25,470,364Gt of cargo with an average of about 8,490,121GT as shown in 
Appendix 4, the Port experienced a downward trend in the number of vessels in this 
period around -3.01%. This was a result of using a private company to dredge the berth 
fronts in 2011 to 2012 within a period of 6 months under JICA projects to have deeper 
channels of 12.5 meters after suffering from sedimentation limitations to receive bigger 
vessels, enabling users to exploit the economics of scale by bigger vessels. Figure (16) 
shows the number of vessels’ calls and their GT in the period 2010 to 2012.   
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Figure 16 Number of vessels calling UQP in 2010 to 2012 
2010 2011 2012
GT(1000) 7,539 8,622 9,335
Vessels 1,106 992 922
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Source: UQP Statistics, vessels calling UQP, Appendix 4 
The obvious opposite trends of the vessels and GT of cargoes  means the users are using 
bigger ships either to avoid the time cost as a bigger ship is less cost than the smallest 
one in terms of commercial cost as their vessels stay more than the usual time in port. 
Or, there are alternative ports attracting the vessels that come to UQP.  
4.3  ANALYSIS SHIP TIME IN CASE STUDY 
Several statements of facts have been provided by local agents in UQP during the 
writing of the research which contained all the data related to port operations to both of 
the water front and land side.  The author has selected two grain and sugar vessels as 
case studies which were coming to the most important agencies namely, Barwil and 
Inchcape. These vessels are calculated as representative of most vessels staying a long 
time in the port compared with other vessels, such as container vessels.   
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4.3.1 M/V SIREEN-B 
M/V SIREEN-B is a bulk carrier that entered the UQP in 2011 February, 11 by 
BARWIL Agency by WILHELMSEN Ship Service in Iraq as shown in the Appendix 3.  
It proceeded to berth 15 in UQP north berths with her voyage number 1 at the date above 
with a Sugar cargo of 18,000 mts gross to record 16 days and 6 hours of  turnaround 
time even though  the vessel was in direct proceed order to the port UQP. 
The vessel's characteristics: Port of registry: Kingstown, IMO number: 8214906, Year 
Built: 1984, length x Breadth: 152 m X 24 m, speed recorded (Max / Average): 14.8 / 
11.9 knots, flag: St Vincent Grenadines, 4 Holds, Hatches: 4 Hatches Macgregor, 
Gear: 3 Carnes x 25 Tons / 1 Derrick x 25 Tons. Flag: St Vincent Grenadines - . 
Last Position Received is Area of Black Sea (Traffic.Com, Live Map, 2013). 
In Table (9) calculations are made according to the case study in lecture hand-outs 2013 
of Professor Moon: 
Table 9 Calculations of Time in Port of M/V SIREEN-B 
Items Mints Hrs Days
Average time in port 22185.00 369.75 15.41
Average waiting time 1503.00 25.05 1.04
Average manoeuvring time 642.00 10.70 0.45
Average service/berth time 20055.00 334.25 13.93
Average productive time 4395.00 73.25 3.05
Average idle time 15625.00 260.42 10.85
Average productive ratio (%) 21.9% 0% 0.02%
Grade of waitng (or Ave Waiting Rate) (%) 7.5% 0% 0%
Source: BARWIL Agency document 
Before analyzing the data of this vessel, it is better to give a reason why this vessel was 
chosen among other vessels that were delayed as well. It was selected for many reasons. 
Firstly, according to UQP statistics, it came to UQP twice. The first time was from 
February 11, 2011 to February 27, 2011, which will be studied now, and the second time 
was from October 09, 2011 to October 27, 2011, which was the last time it visited the 
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UQP. Secondly, the vessel was an example of the port working with a 7 hours break 
time, each day. Finally, it is an example of when UQP was taking samples of cargo from 
vessels alongside berths to enforce vessels waiting for more than three days until the 
analysis result was received. 
Figure 17 Main elements of TRT of M/V Sireen-b 
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Source: Barwil Agency document 
Let’s start with productivity time and idle time as the most important in the port 
operation then back to analyzing the waiting time as the most significant element in total 
time in the port. From Figure (17) it is clear that idle time dominated on the productivity 
time as the idle time equaled 11.7 days while the productivity time is equal to only 3 
days since cargo handling have not been 24 hours as the break time stopping the work of 
labors during the day i.e., the vessel has berthed but labors were not ready to work.  In 
other words, the human resources should be studied and identified. Another factor that 
affects the productive time directly is the shortage of trucks.  Many times there were no 
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trucks to receive the cargo during the work. GCPI should optimize the availability of 
truck immediately by to solve this problem; otherwise, the productivity at UQP 
operations will suffer from too much idle time.  
Therefore, the Service Time was about 14 days. It is a natural result due to excessive 
idle time in the port. 
Grade of Waiting with 7.5% was reasonable as the vessel did not take a sample in the 
anchorage area. The major part of waiting time is a sample taken for checking the cargo 
by Port Authority. However, for this vessel the case was changed from taking the sample 
in the anchorage area to when the vessel went alongside its berth as shown in appendix 
5-b. 
Maneuvering Time was about 10 hours and 42 minutes since there is a channel 50 miles 
long plus 10 miles of anchorage area, it is reasonable according to her average speed 
11.9 knots ( 60/11.9 x 2=10.08) taking into consideration the age of the vessel that built 
in 1984. 
4.3.2  M/V CAPTAIN HARRY 
M/V Captain Harry, a bulk carrier entered UQP in 2011 January, 08 through Inchcape 
Agency in Iraq as shown in the Appendix (6-a), (6-b). It was carrying 40045.113 MT 
bulk rice from Darrow, LA/USA. 
The author has selected this vessel for many reasons. Firstly, it was coming to UQP only 
one time in January 11, 2011 and left in February 15, 2011, which was to be the last time 
it visited the UQP. Secondly, for the port, the vessel was a sample for working within 24 
hours a day. Finally, it is an example of when UQP was taking samples of cargo when 
the vessels were outside of berths, to enforce a waiting time of more than three days 
until the analysis was result received. However, the case was worse for other dry, 
 
 
 
 
 52    
  
bagging general cargo and other vessels which spent more than a month as it will be 
seen in the next sections. 
Vessel's characteristics by (Traffic.Com, Live Map, 2013) 
Port of registry: Kingstown, IMO number: 9451173, MMSI: 311041400, Year Built: 
2010, Length x Breadth: 190 m X 32 m, speed recorded (Max / Average): 10.8 / 10.1 
knots, flag: St Vincent Grenadines, 4 Holds, Hatches: 4 Hatches Macgregor, Gear: 3 
Carnes x 25 Tons / 1 Derrick x 25 Tons. GT: 33194, DWT: 57266 t. and her 
Flag: Bahamas- . Last position is in area of Indian Ocean. 
In Table (10) calculations are made also according to the case study in lecture hand-outs 
2013 of Prof. Moon: 
Table 10 Calculations of Time in Port of M/V CAPTAIN HARRY 
Items Mints Hrs Days
Average time in port 54400.00 906.67 37.78
Average waiting time 36710.00 611.83 25.49
Average manoeuvring time 602.00 10.03 0.42
Average service/berth time 17123.00 285.38 11.89
Average productive time 11581.00 193.02 8.04
Average Idle Time 5507.00 91.78 3.82
Average productive ratio (%) 67.6% 1% 0.05%
Grade of waitng (or Ave Waiting Rate) (%) 214.4% 4% 0%
Source: Inchcape Agency document 
With this vessel the case was changed to the better situation in port operations where the 
productivity ratio was 67.6% while the idle time was 32% only. However, there were 
many stoppage cases during the handling operations as shown in Appendix (6) due to 
break down of hoppers or unavailability of the trucks as well as weather conditions, also 
within the idle time. However, the stops did not involve all holds of the vessel, if taking 
into accounts these partial stops, the productivity will be affected to be less than 8 days. 
The worst is the waiting time with 25 days and 11.5 hours with trouble Grade of Waiting 
time (GW) to equal 214.3% due to sample taken, as the agent of the vessel mentioned by 
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telephone through the questionnaire survey analyzed in chapter 3. He said it was taken a 
sample for checking and the analysis results for the vessel were not received until this 
trouble period pass to reach about 25 days and 11 hours. 
  Figure 18 Main elements of TRT of M/V Captain Harry 
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Source: Inchcape Agency document 
To analyze the waiting time from Table (18), it is clear that the waiting time dominated 
the productive time and other port times. However, the productive time was better than 
the idle time as it was 3 days while the productive time was 8 days.  
In spite of improvement of productive time, there was a big problem with the waiting 
time as a result of not receiving the analysis of sample results of the cargo from the trade 
ministry representatives under the health authority in Baghdad, about 500 km away from 
Basrah, as well as the distance of the channel from UQP about 50 miles using a small 
boat to reach the vessel.  
However, the situation is different in case of calculations of average time for all vessels 
for period of monthly or yearly time. In addition, the case is very different with 
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container vessels in terms of waiting time and other items. As the cargo has no analyzed 
samples to wait for the berths have high speed handling by gantry and the mobile cranes, 
as mentioned in Tables (6) and (7) as new equipment, to minimize the time so there is 
little or no downtime.  
4.4  AVERAGE TIME ‘AT’ IN THE PORT 
The average time in the port of the vessels is a summation of the entire vessel times 
calling the port monthly, quarterly or yearly as a way to measure the performance of the 
port to give an indicator to identify the bottlenecks in port operations in order to develop 
appropriate solutions accordingly. However, according to available data of 2011, it was 
limited to calculate only Average Waiting Time, Average Service or Berthing Time and 
Average Time at the Port TRT.  
4.4.1 AVERAGE TIME IN THE BERTS 20-21 IN UQPN   
The average time in berths 20-21 as a container terminal in 2008 is 6.85 days. Average 
Waiting Time (AWT) is 12.5 hours while the Average Idle Time (AIT) is 2.71 days and 
the Average Productive Ratio (APR) was 57.2%. Which means the berths are suffering 
from difficulties in much idle time and waiting time, affecting berth productivity 
negatively as Table (11) and Figure (19) show. 
Table 11 Time in UQP: Berths 20-21, Container Terminal  
Items Days
average time in port (ATP ) 6.85
average waiting time (AWT) 0.52
average berth time (ABT) 6.33
average productive time (APT) 3.62
average idle time (AIT) 2.71
average productive ratio (APR) 0.02
average grade of waiting (AGW) 0.00
Container VesselsTimes in UQP-Berths 20-21 in 2008
Source: UQP management statistics  
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Figure 19 Main elements of TRT in UQP in Berths 20-21 
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Source: UQP management Statistics  
4.4.2 AVERAGE TIME IN UQP IN 2011 AT VESSEL SIZE GROUPS 
The average time in UQP for 22 berths in 2011 was better than 2008, in particular in the 
container terminals, as there is good handling equipment to reduce the idle time and no 
analyses of samples for the cargo as the case of dry cargo vessels. However, it did not 
match with requirements of users to satisfy international standards, or even compared 
with neighbouring ports. Therefore, it is better to classify vessels according to the cargo 
they carry as mentioned in handouts of Professor Moon 2003, Port Logistics and 
Planning as follow: 
1. Bulk Cargo 
a. Dry bulk cargo: Grain, Coal and Ore Carriers 
b. Liquid bulk cargo: Petroleum, Product oil, Chemical products, and 
liquefied gas Carriers  
2. Break-bulk Cargo: General Cargo 
a. Container Cargo: Containerships 
b. Passenger, Car and Truck Ships  
c. General Cargo Ships, and other general cargo ships 
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However, the author classified the ships calling UQP in 2011 into dry bulk and bagging 
cargo carriers to involve the grain, rice and sugar ships, break-bulk carriers to involve 
the container ships, and the general and other cargo ships to involve the general cargo, 
passenger, car and truck, equipment, and cement ships in accordance approximately of 
the long stay in the UQP. There was a shortage of data related to the port operations, in 
particular the handling of the cargo, to exclude the Average Idle Time (AIT) and 
Average Productive Ration (APR). However, it shared the important elements of time in 
port like the ATP, AWT, ABT and AGW. 
4.4.3 AVERAGE TIME IN DRY BULK AND BAGGING CARRIERS 
The average time of dry bulk and bagging carriers in UQP in 2011 is 21.25 days. 
Average Waiting Time (AWT) is 10.57 days, while the Average service Time (ABT) is 
10.31 days; the Average Grade of Waiting (AGW) was 102.5% hours which supporting 
the results in the M/V SIREEN-B and CAPTAIN HARRY to give the clear picture that 
the most delays in the UQP occur with these vessels types due to the analysis of cargo to 
take samples procedures as well as the breakdown of the equipment. These results are 
shown in Table (12) and Figure (20) for the important elements of time in port as 
follows: 
Table 12 Time in UQP:  Dry bulk and bagging Carriers in 2011 
ATP (hours) average time in port 510.1 21.25 ATP (Days)
AWT (hours) average waiting time 253.7 10.57 AWT (Days)
ABT (hours) average berth time 247.5 10.31 ABT (Days)
APT (hours) average productive time 247.5 10.31 APT (Days)
AIT (hours) average idle time 0.0 0.00 AIT (Days)
APR average productive ratio 100.0% 0.04 APR
AGW average grade of waiting 102.5% 0.04 AGW
Dry bulk Carriers Time related to KPIs DAYS
 
Source: UQP- Coastal Station Unit Statistic 
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Figure 20 Mail elements of TRT of dry and bagging Carriers in UQP in 2011 
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 Source: UQP- Coastal Station Unit Statistic 
 
4.4.4 AVERAGE TIME IN BREAK-BULK: CONTAINER CARGO  
The average time of break-bulk carriers: container cargo in UQP in 2011 is 104.2 hours. 
Average Waiting Time (AWT) is 7.5 hours while the Average service time is 87.2 hours 
(3 days and 15.2 hours) and the Average Grade Waiting (AGW) was 9.1% to illustrate a 
good improvement compared with 2008, as a result of the progress of the JICA projects 
and other private joint venture berths. Table (13) and Figure (21) show the important 
elements of time in port as follows:  
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Table 13 Time in UQP: Break-bulk: Container Vessels in 2011 
ATP (hours) average time in port 104.2 4.34 ATP (Days)
AWT (hours) average waiting time 7.9 0.33 AWT (Days)
ABT (hours) average berth time 87.2 3.63 ABT (Days)
APT (hours) average productive time 87.2 3.63 APT (Days)
AIT (hours) average idle time 0.0 0.00 AIT (Days)
APR average productive ratio 100.0% 0.04 APR
AGW average grade of waiting 9.1% 0.00 AGW
Break bulk :  Conts  Vs ls  Time related to KPIs DAYS
 
Source: UQP- Coastal Station Unit Statistics 
Figure 21 Main elements of TRT of Container vessels in UQP in 2011 
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Source: UQP- Coastal Station Unit Statistics 
4.4.5 AVERAGE TIME IN GENERAL CARGO & OTHER VSLS 
The average time in break-bulk: the general cargo and other vessels in UQP in 2011 are 
13.86 days. Average Waiting Time (AWT) is 8.22 days while the Average Berth 
(Service) Time (ABT) is 5.22 days and the Average Grade Waiting (AGW) was 157.4% 
which means the situation is quite bad in terms of the delay of the vessels at the port due 
to several reasons. First, the cement, equipment carriers and general cargo have had 
samples taken to check at Iraqi labs and to receive the analysis result took a long time. 
 
 
 
 
 59    
  
Secondly, the old Quay Cranes are another reason for delays as they always have 
downtimes during work. The stevedore activities have bad performance as well as the 
unavailability of trucks as seen in the cases of SIREEN-B and CAPTAIN HARRY 
vessels. These results in Table (14) and Figure (22) show the important elements of time 
in port as follows:   
Table 14 Time in UQP: Break-bulk, General Cargo and other Vessels in 2011 
ATP (hours) average time in port 332.7 13.86 ATP (Days)
AWT (hours) average waiting time 197.2 8.22 AWT (Days)
ABT (hours) average berth time 125.3 5.22 ABT (Days)
APT (hours) average productive time 125.3 5.22 APT (Days)
AIT (hours) average idle time 0.0 0.00 AIT (Days)
APR average productive ratio 100.0% 0.04 APR
AGW average grade of waiting 157.4% 0.07 AGW
General Cargo & other vsls related to KPIs DAYS
 
Source: UQP- Coastal Station Unit Statistics 
Figure 22 Main elements of TRT of G Cargo & other vessels in UQP in 2011 
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Source: UQP- Coastal Station Unit Statistic  
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4.4.6 AVERAGE SERVICE TIME IN UQP IN 2005 TO 2013 
The ABT of vessels fluctuated (6.5 to 12.5 days) from 2005 to 2013 as Figure (23) 
shows. The highest period was in 2005 followed by a slight decrease in time to record a 
good improvement, as an increase in number of containers to speed up the handling 
operations in the port within the year followed the concession for Gulftainer and other 
private companies. As a result, there are obvious improvements in trends of service time. 
Figure 23 UQP Service Time in 2005 to 2013 
 
Source: GCPI, Maritime Control Unit 
4.4.7 UQPS AND UQPN ANNUAL IMPROVEMENT 
 In 2012 the gross tonnage (GT) in North and South UQP in total was 9,335,000: 
4,606,285GT by UQPN and 4,658,008 by UQPS see Figure 24.  
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Figure 24 UQPN & UQPS cargoes in GT in 2012 
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Source: UQP Statistic 
In number of vessels, in 2012, the UQPN recorded about 502 vessels and the UQPS only 
about 420 vessels. Also there was a sharp decline in gross tonnage in UQPN and UQPS 
in April due to the fact that the trade ministry finishes its contracts for the transportation 
of the cargoes in March and has to renew the contracts in April as the Figures (24) and 
(25) show.  
Figure 25  Number of Vessels Calling UQPN & UQPS in 2012 
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Source: UQP Statistics   
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In spite of fluctuations in of the trend lines in GT and Number of vessels, it could be 
noted that the north port of UQP is more improved although there are no private 
investments, like the South of UQP which has privatisation of contracts such as berth # 4 
a by French shipping company (CMA-CGM), berth # 5 by Joint Venture Martrade/Gazal 
and berth # 8 by Gulftainer, for handling containers. When searching in the data and 
analyzing the information through discussions  with the staff of GCPI and the agents as 
well, it appears that the qualification of the staff is the most important factor to increase 
this growth compared with south port. A key factor in the growth of the North port has 
been its manager, who graduated from WMU in 2010, and began managing UQPN at 
the end of 2011. 
4.5   ANALYSIS AND IMPLICATION ON KPIs OUTCOMES 
As defended above, the time in port is a summation of the time of the vessel in the port 
to give good indicators to measure port performance. But, with limitation of availability 
of the data, it may be difficult to reach all the stages of turnaround time of the vessel in 
UQP which are shown in section 5.3. However, the Average Time at the Port (ATP), 
The Average Waiting Time, average berthing or serving time (AWT), average 
productive time (APT), average idle time (AIT) and Average Grade Waiting (AGW) are 
the main elements of time of the vessels in the port that, which was calculated to come 
in line with the purpose of this study, as it is related to the time of the vessel in the port 
according to the years provided by GCPI. 
Although some analysis is given in the above explanations, it is better to pass deep 
analysis on the main elements of the turnaround time of the vessel in UQP in accordance 
with the previous sections and data provided by UQP management as follow: 
4.5.1 AVERAGE TIME IN PORT (ATP) 
The ATP is a summation of the time of the vessel in the port for all items mentioned in 
section 4.5. The ATP in 2008 at the CT of berth 20-21 fluctuated from 1.3 days to 16 
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days and in some cases exceed 27 days, with the average being 6.85 days. However, the 
situation was quite good in 2011, even with all berths used to handle container cargo, 
compared with 2008. ATP ranged from 0.5 days (12 hours) to 16.9 days with an average 
of 4.3 days, which gives a good impression about improvement to the port efficiency the 
difference in ATP between 2008 and 2011, is mainly attributable to a higher number of 
container vessels being able to proceed directly to berth rather than waiting in the 
anchorage area in 2011. 
Unfortunately, the case was worse with dry bulk carriers, bagging cargo vessels, general 
cargo and other vessels in multipurpose berths, except the passenger and car ships.  ATP 
in dry bulk and bagging cargo ships fluctuated through the months in 2011 from 9.1 
days to more than a month with AT about 21.3 days due to the waiting time for samples 
of cargo, and several stops in the equipment in the port as well as the unavailability of 
trucks for the handling of the cargo. 
4.5.2 AVERAGE WAITING TIME (AWT) 
Waiting time in UQP is a summation of time in the anchorage area where the vessel is 
anchored to wait its turn in a queue until it anchors up to proceed to buoy # 1 to pick up 
the pilot in the anchorage area nearby the Al-Basrah oil terminal. 
The largest part of AWT is time waiting for a berth for general cargo, sugar, grains and 
rice vessels. They spend more than 10 days and in some cases about a month as it was 
seen in the Captain Harry vessel mentioned above. However, with container vessels the 
case is better than others due to the quick handle operations there, and no samples of 
cargo taken.  
Vessels in the anchorage area that they had to wait due to the analysis sample results 
spent more time in the waiting area to get permission to proceed to the berth. Moreover, 
especially for multipurpose berths, vessels already on berth for unloading cargo often 
endured waiting time because trucks to load in were not available or not ready in the 
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port in addition to breakdowns of cranes; these factors combined caused the vessels to 
have to spend a long time in the anchorage area.  
Furthermore, waiting time was affected by inefficient procedures to take and analyze 
samples of grains, sugars, rice and other general cargo, in some cases adding more than 
one month to the vessel waiting time. However, the situation is changing these days by 
following a new policy as the trade ministry announced to analyze the samples in the 
United Emirates in Dubai rather than in Iraqi labs which have poor equipment. But, 
unfortunately, sometimes samples taken more time to Iraqi labs cause additional delay to 
the vessel time due to cargo inspection. Sometimes the cargo contains 10 kinds of sugar 
and is stacked in a way that it cannot be inspected at once. 
 The health authority takes the sample of cargo which is close to the hatch cover and 
when the results come out they allow this cargo to be unloaded. Then another sample of 
cargo appears which needs to be inspected. This happens with different types of cargo, 
especially with sugar and rice ships. As the case with M/V SIREEN-B and CAPTAIN 
HARRY, these vessels are taken as examples of the worst cases in the port as they 
greatly influence the calculations of the total time in the port on average. 
4.5.3 AVERAGE MANEUVERING TIME (AMT) 
As mentioned in section  3.1.5, there is a draft limitation of the approach channel, which 
is 50 nautical miles from buoy 1 to UQP with a width of 200m during low water tide, 
ranging from 7-10m. However, the GCPI has equipped this unit with multi dredgers to 
maintain the average depth at 12.5m. Therefore, this situation might be affected by the 
fluctuations of dredger vessel performance which forced the GCPI by 2012, to reduce 
the permissible draft to less than 12.5m. The case may be worse only with bigger ships 
but will affect the productivity of the berths. As a result, the MT for any vessel entering 
the Khor Abdullah Channel is approximately 10 hours, as was seen by the M/V 
SIREEN-B (10 hours and 42 minutes) and CAPTAIN HARRY (10 hours and 3 
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minutes), and the situation was the same with vessels in 2011, fluctuating between 10 to 
12 hours. 
4.5.4 AVERAGE BERTHING OR SERVING TIME (ABT) 
The ABT of vessels fluctuated (6.5 to 12.5 days) from 2005 to 2013 as Figure 23 shows. 
The highest period was in 2005 followed by a slight decreasing in this time to record a 
good improvement, with an increase in the number of container berths to speed up the 
handling operations in the port, followed by the concession for Gulftainer and other 
private companies.  
4.5.5 AVERAGE PRODUCTIVE TIME (APT) AND AVERAGE IDLE 
TIME (AIT) 
APT for a grain, or dry bulk cargos, sugar and rice, as bagging cargo vessels, as well as 
the container vessels was unsatisfactory in terms of APT compared with AIT. For 
example in case of M/V SIREEN-B with sugar cargo, the APT was 3 days while there 
were 10 days and 20 hours of Idle time due to several reasons. Stops happened because 
no trucks were available, and Cranes were out of order In addition, break times and stops 
for rain and bad weather to avoid damaging of the cargo added to AIT. Furthermore, 
stevedoring activities were still done by ship cranes, leading to low productivity, and an 
increase in the average time at the port of the multipurpose berths.  
In the Container Terminal of 20-21 berths in 2008, the productive time fluctuated but 
when the average time improved compared with idle time. However, the improvement is 
not a satisfactory with competitive level, as the APT is equal to 3.62 while the AIT is 
equal 2.71. However, the situation improved in 2011 in these berths compared with 
2008. 
In the multipurpose berths for bagging cargo, dry bulk and general cargo, the situation is 
worse as most Quay Cranes were installed in 1983 and have several downtimes during 
the work. In case of the M/V SIREEN-B, it is the worst example of work at the port, 
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when productive time was 3.05 days, while the idle time was 10.85 days as there were 
many downtimes in the equipment of the port. 
In spite of some improvements in  the average time in container terminals and other 
multipurpose berths in UQP , there was still inefficient time related to the idle time as a 
result of more holidays in the year, no trucks, break times, lack of  planning between the 
port and vessels, direct discharge to the trucks and a very small proportion going  to the 
storage area and there are no port trucks to use to transport the containers to the yards, 
which means the port uses a forklift for this purpose. 
In other words, there are good gantry cranes to clear the ships-to-shore, but there are 
inefficient and lack of equipment to lift the containers away to the storage areas when 
there are no trucks to load and discharge containers or other cargo in the multi-purpose 
berths. Forklifts and other essential equipment are very important to secure the flow of 
containers from the ship to shore; otherwise it causes much idle time to delay the vessels 
and maximizes time in the port. However, with limitations of data, as mentioned above, 
some port operations are (for example) not calculated, the (BOR), (CUR) and Labor 
Utilization Ration (LUR), in order to indicate the labour and crane productivity. 
4.5.6 AVERAGE GRADE WAITING TIME (AGW) 
The case with Average Grade Waiting in container berths is different than multipurpose 
berths, as there is quick handling of cargo. However, it was quite high in 2011, at 9.1% 
which means there is too much idle time resulting in a low productivity case in the 
handling of the cargo.  
4.6  SIGNIFICANT WAYS TO IMPROVE THE TIME IN UQP 
(Alderton, 2005, p. 189) Stated that “Minimizing the time a ship spends in port will now 
be virtually every port manager’s priority. This priority increases as ships grow in size 
and capital intensity and ports face increasing competition for customers.” Therefore, the 
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GCPI should be concerned about the long time spent by vessels; otherwise it will be 
weak to achieve and sustain the efficiency and development needed.  
According to Professor Moon in his lecture handouts of 2013, there are four ways to 
reduce waiting time cited from Venus Lun, Lai and T.C. Edwin Cheng (2006), as 
follows: 
1. Increase the berth capacity: the number of berths 
2. The relation of ‘Delay Ratio’ with ‘BOR’ 
3. Increase the working time at berths 
4. Increase the terminal cargo-handling productivity 
There is no problem related to the number of the berths in UQP. However, the remaining 
ways are highly required to reduce the waiting time and increase the productivity in the 
port. Changing the method of working into two-shifts instead of daywork plus overtime 
is a better way to reduce the time of the vessels at the port, as introduced in 1981 in the 
port of Hull in United Kingdom, a below-average productivity rate per day in the port of 
Hull by comparison with competing ports (particularly on the east coast of the United 
Kingdom and North Continent) is the one of the prime factors of contributing to improve 
the productivity per day, and enhance ship turnround time by at least 70/80 per cent. 
(UNCTAD/SHIPP/494(1), 1983) 
Moreover, applying the IT system with Vessels Traffic Services (VTS) within the port 
area are most essential to the UQP to organize all its activities to save ship time as a 
result of saving the time in the port, as it would record all the values to enable the 
technical personnel to find the bottlenecks and other issues are required to carry out any 
plan for an investment in the port in which the port should achieve its services within 
standard international port levels.  
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5 CONCLUSION & RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
5.1  CONCLUSTION 
A pillar of the national economy is the port, not only as a gateway for entry of  cheaper 
prices compared with other transportation modes but also as a source of revenue to the 
government and a means for other country activities which will be delayed  if  the port 
has inadequate functions to receive the cargo. The hospital, for example, will not render 
a service to the people if its medicines are delayed in the port, the building will not be 
completed by the engineer on time in the case that the port is not able to flow the cargo 
of his building materials smoothly, as planned.  
Therefore, the Iraqi government should give higher care to make their ports work 
effectively and efficiently to secure the most country activities, as 90% of world trade 
depends on transporting goods by water. On the other hand, the GCPI as a port authority 
should pay special attention to the time factor at port by making a good planning 
strategy and taking effective steps to be efficient to meet with the demand of the 
country. 
The main objective of this research was to study the turnaround time in the UQP to find 
the problems that prolong the time of vessels and to recommend solutions for these 
problems and constraints related to time/cost in order to be more efficient and effective 
within a shorter total time in port of a vessel. By doing so, it will be more attractive for 
users, which will increase the number of vessels calling this port and, therefore, result in 
more revenue for the port and more benefits to the users as well.  
To achieve the above objective, the author used an analysis of the time at port of a 
vessel, Turnaround time, through a literature review to study significant previous 
research, reports and conferences, which have developed the subject.                                 
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A questionnaire was carried out by preparing inquiries to ports’ clients in order to 
support research findings through contacting shipping lines and consignees. The port 
performance indicator was used with available data to provide a profound analysis to 
identify how the port operated in effective and efficient ways to support the 
developments needed. 
5.2  RECOMMENDATIONS 
Recommendations are classified according to the previous chapters into three parts: 
navigation, berthing and land control to minimize the time in UQP. 
5.2.1 NAVIGATIONAL CONTROL 
To minimize time in the navigational channel at UQP, involving the maneuvering in the 
channel and at the anchorage area, embarking and disembarking the sea pilot and 
harbour pilot and the berthing and unberthing operations, it is necessary to break down 
the activities of the stages of transferring the vessels from on stage to another. 
5.2.1.1 WAITING TIME   
In UQP, there are two crucial elements of the waiting time that have a direct impact on 
the time in the port that should be minimized. The first factor is taking samples of the 
cargo when the vessel is anchored. This case involves the general cargo, grain, sugar and 
rice vessels, by trade ministry representatives under health authority, and should be 
converted into a modern way to be suitable with respect to time in port.  
Although, the Iraqi Government has signed agreements with a number of international 
cargo inspection companies to take samples of cargo before they arrive to port, the cargo 
receiver requires another inspection of the cargo which results in vessels waiting at the 
anchorage area or in some cases at the berth to achieve another delay, increasing the 
total time and the waiting time in particular. 
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Therefore, the consignees have to rely on the results of these international inspectors in 
order to allow ships to berth on arrival and avoiding delays for second inspection. The 
lab used for analysis of the cargo should be equipped with modern devices to give quick 
results; it should be at Basrah or UQP instead of Baghdad, 500 Km plus a 50 mile 
channel away. The other factor affecting the waiting time is the idle time in the berths 
when the vessels waiting at berth for sample results, or due to the equipment breakdown 
and unavailability of the trucks as a result the vessel is occupying the berth with idle 
time, making the berth unavailable to other vessels. 
Therefore, it is necessary to reduce the idle time by making sure the trucks are ready 
when the handling operation is in progress. Increasing terminal cargo handling 
productivity by optimizing the stevedoring activities can be assisted by using port’s 
modern cranes rather than the cranes of the vessels for all cargo handling activities. 
An efficient truck control system should be implemented to avoid uncertainty and delays 
of lack of trucks and better turnaround time for trucks not only in the port but at all 
destinations. Further, the port should select a competent trucking company to avoid 
losing time which increases costs in the port for its clients.   
In other words it is highly required to solve, the breakdown of the cranes and trucks 
through outsourcing to private companies to secure these services in a good and timely 
manner to avoid the high cost of vessels spending more time in the port. 
5.2.1.2 MANEUVERING TIME 
This stage involves the time when the vessel passes the sea (EOSP) enter to the 
anchorage area to drop anchor in case it has not direct order, and the time when the 
vessels enter the access channel to proceed to berths through the Khor Abdullah Channel 
and vice versa.  
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The pilot station at buoy # 1 should be able to reach the anchored vessels rather than 
forcing them to stop many times to pick up the sea pilot onboard. The pilot vessel should 
order the coming vessel to drop anchor with suitable distance and easy access to the 
channel, which should be approved by Vessels Traffic Services ‘VTS’ as well as the port 
area. With IT system, scheduling in advance can be achieved.  
Regular maintenance of the buoys is advised to avoid blackouts for long periods of time 
and avoid giving rise to a bad reputable to the channel. 
Due to the problem of sedimentation related to the draft in UQP in particular, UQPN is 
required to take real steps through GCPI and a Consultant firm as they did in 2008, with 
DANIDA. But unfortunately this was refused by GCPI because of the navigational 
hazards when the consultant proposed to reduce the mouth of the river to the North port 
(UQPN). 
Dumping of dredged materials by dredger vessels about 1 to 3 miles away from the UQP 
in the channel of Khor Abdullah is a major problem in the author’s opinion causing the 
delay of improvement of draft in the channel even though the port recently bought 
modern dredgers to enhance its equipment. Furthermore, the downtimes of the dredger 
vessels have affected the annual rate as well. As a result, it is necessary to optimize the 
berth depths by dredging the quay in such a way as to best accommodate bigger vessels 
for the expected traffic flow over the channel. Therefore, it is needed to carry out annual 
dredging works in both of the access channels and the berth fronts through a dredging 
strategy.  
The tug boat service and pilot station vessel are the most important in the manoeuvering 
operations, in and out which are in connection with the sea and harbour pilots to do the 
berthing and unberthing operations. The port is suffering from this point as its tugs and 
pilot vessel are old and encounter several failures each day. Therefore, the GCPI should 
take care about this service as it affects the time in the port of the vessels directly. 
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5.2.2 BERTH CONTROL  
Handling operations are a part of berth services rendered by the port that should be made 
available full-time rather than cut off by break downs of port cranes or break time for 
laborers and unavailability of trucks and other required services to the vessels. Using the 
method of two shifts in a day and night time will optimize the berth productivity and 
minimize idle time to give good effects to minimize the waiting time. Securing good 
equipment on the berth will avoid excessive delays and enable ships to save time as they 
may engage in supply chain under the method of Just-In-Time, used by several 
companies to encourage them to come to the port. The working hours at the berth should 
be increased as the management should increase the labor productivity. 
Moreover, quality of service is improved by rendering a good service and ensuring 
availability of the trucks and other essential equipment for the vessels to contribute to 
minimizing the total time in port. For example, if the port gives a service of bunkering, 
repairing or waste disposal to the ships, they will be not forced to stop at other ports 
where these services are available; as well it would be a good source of revenue  for the 
port.  
Another source of the delay for the vessels in UQP is the poor performance stevedores 
and unavailability of equipment, which appears obviously in the results of the 
questionnaire survey, this factor will have a strong effect on the work in the port to 
decrease the cargo handling productivity therefore, there is a need to renew this 
equipment along with JICA projects and the port should sign an agreement with  a 
socializing stevedoring company for all cargo handling activities and making a good 
procedure to monitor their performances. 
Moreover, applying the IT system is the most essential to the UQP to organize all its 
activities and save ship time, as a result of saving time in the port as it would record all 
the values to enable the technical personnel to find bottlenecks and other issues required 
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to carry out any plan for an investment in the port in which the port should achieve its 
services to avoid over-supply problems. 
Although using the concession and Joint Venture operation for some berths in UQP, 
which has the advantage to develop the port, there is a negative impact on the 
productivity of other berths which are operated by GCPI as a government company. The 
privatized berths will increase responses to users with less delay and time costs to attract 
the users. Another negative factor might happen, which is over supply of berths if there 
is no planning strategy to calculate the forecast volume of cargo to the port before the 
GCPI will do any investment in the future. 
Developing the concept of KPIs in UQP involves breaking down turnaround time into 
Average Waiting Time (AWT) Average Maneuvering Time (AMT) Average Idle Time 
(AIT) Average Berthing Time (ABT) Crane Utilization Ratio (CUR) and Labor 
Utilization Ratio (LUR) to support a sustainable Productivity comparison with 
developed ports to improve the port as a global average level.  
Using IT systems for all activities in the port will make the mission easy and increase 
working proficiency when an integrated automation system is used in planning, 
recording, stacking, gating in/out and loading/unloading, maintenance equipment 
schedules, tracking the trucks, human resource allocation. 
Based on the KPI analysis, it is unnecessary to invest in new berths in UQP or put more 
berths under concession and joint venture, in particular in UQPN. Reducing the waiting 
time and the idle times is a better way to improve productivity of UQP by taking 
practical steps, for instance, outsourcing activities in case the GCPI cannot succeed, as it 
has lengthy governmental procedures. 
Further studies need to be carried out for equipment utilization and labor utilization with 
other KPIs in order to decide whether more investment is needed or not to enhance 
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existing capacity. Implementing a Terminal Operation System will enable the port 
management to analyze with more accuracy the future needs and raise the service level 
to meet customers’ satisfaction.   
5.2.3 LAND CONTROL 
Land control involves the national highways and railway networks that serve the main 
cities in Basra and Baghdad, the capital of Iraq and other connectivity to the ports. The 
berths are accessed by truck via the main gate of UQP. Rail tracks connect the port via 
Shouaiba junction where the area is the west of Basrah city.  However, the national Iraqi 
road and railway network are very old and experience several difficulties. As a result, 
there is an urgent need for hinterland network renewal or repair to flow the cargo from 
the UQPS and UQPN berths to the Iraqi cities smoothly. 
The outbound lane of the port is relevant for all berths located in the UQPS and UQPN 
which cause frequent congestion to hamper direct access to the respective berths. 
The main gate at UQPN has access to berth numbers 12 to 22. There is a gate belonging 
to these berths, but, unfortunately, is out of order. Therefore, it is necessary to open this 
gate as an alternative way to mitigate the pressure on the main gate and provide a special 
gate to the Container Terminal in the NUQP. In addition, the berths have access to the 
railway network, but the rails are not useful for operations as they are neglected and 
there are technical issues related to Iraqi Railways Corporation (IRC). Thus, it is 
required to coordinate GCPI with IRC to renew this service to contribute with trucks for 
rendering a good service and speed up the service to move the cargo.  
An IT system is necessary to coordinate the trucks and direct them and distribute and 
speed up the documentation that takes a long time at the main gate.  
The Main Corridors are transport routes by road from Neighbouring Ports to Iraqi 
Markets, trucking the cargo in direct ways in the hinterlands linking to countries of 
neighbouring ports. Hence, the intensive competition requires exploiting the advantage 
of the nearest distances and other benefits of UQP compared with its rivals. For 
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example, in the border with Kuwait, the load truck should discharge and be replaced by 
another truck. To ensure an increase of flow cargo, the GCPI, therefore, should take care 
to facilitate the truck roads and optimize the railway network from UQP among the Iraqi 
market shares in all its cities to get an advantage on the cargo that flows through the 
corridors of the neighbouring ports. Using the connectivity of the road and truck concept 
and reforming the road and rail way is the best way to get advantages and offer the 
shortest distance to the markets, which, together with ports quality of service and good 
facilities, may create competitive advantages compared with the port's rivals. 
Furthermore, the truck fleet needs to be enlarged since the existing number of trucks is 
not sufficient to meet the market requirements. On the other hand, reliable trucking 
companies should be introduced as logistics service providers because most of the 
trucking companies are not internationally recognized.  
 
5.3  LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
The assessment and analysis was limited to the data needed to assess the port operations. 
The lack of required data from UQP is due to the old system. If the port obtains a new IT 
system, it would enable the author to qualify the performance and competitiveness levels 
in port operations. However, by contacting GCPI staff, the author was able to collect the 
required data with a margin of inaccurate data as a result of misprints and paper records. 
Some limitations are related to the methodology that the author used, for example, 
questionnaire research as a quantitative method which aims to collect opinions, attitudes, 
and suggestions to identify problems. Therefore, they are affected by work relationships, 
and some people may have thought that their opinions would be shared with the port 
authority, resulting in consequences that they wish to avoid. 
Regarding KPI analysis, there are several challenges such as the possibility of typing 
errors in data reports collected from the port management. Furthermore, in UQP, the 
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Turnaround Time of a vessel has many Units to record the main elements of Time in 
port. Each unit is responsible for one element of the time of the vessels. For example, the 
waiting time recorded is the responsibility of the coastal station and pilot station, and the 
berthing and unberthing times are the responsibility of the navigational unit in the UQP, 
and the handling operation time is the responsibility of port management. 
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APPENDIX (1) QUESTIONNAIRE 
Dear madam/sir,  
I am a student of World Maritime University, and in partial fulfillment of a MSc degree I am 
conducting research on supporting sustainable performance in Umm Qasr Port (UQP) and its 
competitiveness. The concept behind the improvement of the port competitiveness is to solve the 
problems and constraints related to time/cost in order to be more efficient and effective within a 
shorter total time in port of a vessel. By doing so, it will be more attractive for the users, which 
will increase the number of vessels calling this port and, therefore, result in more revenue for the 
port and more benefits to the users as well. Therefore, I aim to achieve an analysis of the time at 
port of a vessel, Turnaround time as well as highlight some of the human, financial and physical 
problems. However, the analysis of the time at port of a vessel is not always reliable due to 
limited information and databases. In the light of the expected global competition between port 
facilities, the researcher wants to develop his analysis to improve the UQP performance and 
make the operations more robust/reliable.  
With this email I ask you for your cooperation in the research on the inventory of adaptation 
measures and strategies feasible for shippers or consignees. Your cooperation helps us to inform 
the researcher about how the UQP can improve and increase its competitiveness by 
modifications to its facilities and minimize the time of the vessel at the port.  
My request to you is the following. I would kindly like to ask you to participate in the research 
by filling out a questionnaire. Alternatively, I ask you to pass this request to the person within 
your company who is best informed about the firms’ transport flows. Please ask him/her to 
contact me by email so I can send him/her the questionnaire.  
I expect it will take about 15 minutes to complete the questionnaire. It goes without saying that 
all information is collected only for academic purposes and stays confidential; no statements will 
be made about individual firms.  Please feel free to contact me for further information. Many 
thanks in advance for your cooperation.  
Best regards,  
Salem G. Hussein 
Shipping and Port Management  
World Maritime University in Malmo Sweden 
I am contacTable at E: s13033@wmu.se  /  salimalj@yahoo.com    
 Tel: 0046722575097 
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   تبيان م/اس
 ،تحية طيبة
 في ميناء ام قصر وادامة الأداء دعم هدفي,  ضمن برنامج دراسة الماجستير, العالمية البحرية الجامعة في نا طالبا
 والمعوقات المشاكل حل هومن اجل التنافسية القدرة تحسين وراء الكامن المفهوم. التنافسية ورفع قدرته PQU
 من امنه للسفينه.اقتصاديه ووفترة بقاء  وفعالية كفاءة الميناء أكثر لكي يكون المتعلقه بالوقت والتكلفه المترتبه عليه
 العوائد تكون وبالتالي، السفن الوافده اليه؛ عدد ويزيد للمستخدمين جاذبية أكثر يكون الميناء سوف بذلك، القيام خلال
ينوي  لذلك،فان الباحث. ويقلل نسب التامين المفروضه والذي يعود بالفائده لكمللميناء مما يزيد من تطويره  أكثر
الميناء (الوقت الكلي للسفينه من فترة دخولها للميناء حتى  في شامل لمرافق خدمات الميناء ووقت السفينه تحليلا
 فإن ذلك، ومع والمادية ةوالمالي البشرية المشاكل بعض على الضوء تسليط عن فضلا مغادرتها اخر عوامه ملاحية)
 وقاعدة محدودية المعلومات بسبب ليس من بالامر السهل دائما الميناء في الدراسه التحليليه لوقت تكلفة السفينه
 تحليله يطور أن يريد الباحث الميناء مرافق في المتوقعة العالمية المنافسة ضوء علاوة على ذلك في. البيانات
 .فاعليهو/  قوة أكثر لعملياتا وجعل ميناءالأداء  لتحسين
وكذلك . التحليليه النماذج باستخدام الميناء في التكلفة ووقت الطاقه الاستيعابيه  مشكلة تقييم يتم سوف الدراسة هذه في
 التي والتدابير الادارية والفوقية، التحتية ، البنيهالميناء ومرافق مستويات، عدة على التكيف تدابير اتخاذ يتم سوف 
 .لتحسين الاداء وبالتالي تتحق الارباح للجميع اتخاذها يينبغ
 سيحصل وبالتالي. للوصول الى افضل الحلول  البحث في اتمام تعاونكم حسن أرجو الإلكتروني البريد هذا مع
منشآته ومرافقه او  على تعديلات إدخال طريق عن التنافسية قدرته وزيادة كيفية تحسين اداء الميناء عن الباحث
ل اخرى تتعلق بطبيعة عملكم تقترحونها تؤدي الى زيادة القدرة التنافسية للميناء وبالتالي يزيد مستوئ الربح حلو
 .لديكم وكذلك الميناء مما يساعد على تطويره وتجهيزه ليوافق الدول المتقدمه
إلى اي  الطلب هذا مريرمن جنابكم ت وأود. الاستبيان المرفق ادناه ملء طريق عن تشاركوا بالبحث العلمي أن طلبي
 أرسل أن أستطيع حتى الإلكتروني البريد طريق عن بي مراسلتي او الاتصالشركتكم او عملكم للقيام ب ضمن شخص
 المعلومات جميع أن وللعلم. دقيقة على الاكثر 15 حوالي أن يستغرق ملئ الاستبيان وأتوقع .الاستبيان لها ورقة/  له
 جزيلا كراوش المعلومات من لمزيد بي الاتصال في تتردد لا .هيم لاغراض اكاديموتستخد على سريه كامله ستبقى
 التحيات، أطيب مع لتعاونكم، مقدما
   حسينجبار سالم
 الموانئ والنقل البحري طالب دراسات عليا تخصص في إدارة
 السويد - مالمو في العالمية البحرية الجامعة
 7905752276400هاتف /   /moc.oohay@jlamilas    es.umw@33031sالبريد الكتروني/ 
 
 
 
 
 82    
  
APPENDIX (2) QUESTIONNAIRE-RESPONDENT RESULTS 
Distrubtion: 27 Q
ITEMS            Very Poor Poor Satisfactory Good Very Good
Channel  Services 17.6 52.9 23.5 11.8 0.0
Depths of the Channel 11.8 64.7 11.8 5.9 0.0
Lighting System 11.8 35.3 29.4 5.9 5.9
Pilot Service 0.0 23.5 58.8 11.8 5.9
Pilot Station Performance 23.5 47.1 29.4 17.6 0.0
Coast Station 0.0 23.5 52.9 11.8 0.0
Tugging Services 0.0 70.6 23.5 11.8 0.0
Mooring Team 0.0 11.8 23.5 64.7 11.8
Punctuality(Timekeeping) 5.9 41.2 41.2 11.8 0.0
Comments:
ITEMS            Very Good Good Satisfactory Poor Very Poor
Berth availability 11.8 52.9 35.3 11.8 0.0
Pilot station vessel 0.0 17.6 29.4 41.2 11.8
Pilots availability 0.0 47.1 41.2 11.8 0.0
 Tug boats 0.0 11.8 17.6 64.7 5.9
Harbour Pilot availability 11.8 35.3 47.1 5.9 5.9
Draft depth availability 0.0 5.9 29.4 47.1 17.6
Shipping Lines and Agents Questionnaire-respondent results
1.      Evaluation of Safety of Navigation in the Port
there is required to new tugs and pilot boats
2.      Availability of facilities 
Respondents: 63.0%
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ITEMS            Very Poor Poor Satisfactory Good Very Good
Punctuality(Timekeeping) 5.9 47.1 17.6 29.4 0.0
Performance 17.6 47.1 11.8 5.9 0.0
Discipline 29.4 29.4 41.2 35.3 0.0
Present on Station 0.0 17.6 41.2 41.2 0.0
Supervisor Corporation 11.8 23.5 29.4 23.5 11.8
Berth lengths 0.0 29.4 47.1 11.8 5.9
Lift &Crane status 17.6 29.4 41.2 0.0 0.0
Driver performance 0.0 64.7 35.3 0.0 0.0
Storage areas 23.5 29.4 29.4 11.8 5.9
Comments:
ITEMS Very Risky Risky Fairly Risky Poor Safely
Type of Safety Risk 0.0 23.5 58.8 17.6 0.0
Access Channel 0.0 17.6 35.3 35.3 0.0
Pilot Embarking/Disembarking 0.0 41.2 0.0 23.5 0.0
Cargo Handling & Equipment 0.0 47.1 0.0 52.9 0.0
Dangerous Lifting Handling 0.0 41.2 29.4 35.3 0.0
Heavy Lifts Handing 23.5 23.5 0.0 47.1 0.0
have no valid certificates or licenses
4.      Degree of Risk on General Port Safety
3.      Stevedores Performance and Conduct.
Labors and Cranes operators are not qualified and 
Comments: All discharging gears should have valid certificates 
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ITEMS            Very Good Good Satisfactory Poor Very Poor
Fender Conditions 52.9 47.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
Type of Equipment/Gear 0.0 0.0 23.5 41.2 29.4
Portal Cranes 0.0 0.0 11.8 41.2 17.6
Forklifts 0.0 0.0 52.9 35.3 11.8
Terminal Tractors 0.0 0.0 41.2 41.2 17.6
Container Cranes 0.0 29.4 5.9 52.9 5.9
Lashing Service 0.0 11.8 11.8 47.1 17.6
Quay Transfer Operations 0.0 5.9 17.6 64.7 11.8
Rope Slings 0.0 11.8 11.8 64.7 0.0
Wire Slings 0.0 11.8 5.9 52.9 17.6
Chain Slings 0.0 0.0 35.3 52.9 11.8
Rope Nets 0.0 0.0 29.4 47.1 17.6
Wire Nets 0.0 0.0 29.4 52.9 11.8
Cargo Trays 0.0 17.6 17.6 35.3 17.6
Plate Clamps 0.0 11.8 11.8 41.2 0.0
Pallet 0.0 17.6 17.6 52.9 0.0
Snottier Wires 0.0 11.8 29.4 52.9 0.0
Comments:
5.      Availability of Equipment and Cargo Gears
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ITEMS
Current Maximum Duration Taking 
Place within
(5) days (10) days (15) days
17.6 11.8 52.9
(3) days (5) days (5-8) days 
29.4 0.0 47.1
Ideal Duration for cargo delivery from 
Users’ point of view?
(3) days (2) days (1) day
52.9 17.6 29.4
Comments: Cargoes for government take a long 
time in custom clearance while for 
private cargo could be finished in the 
same day they arrived
Period
Current Minimum Duration Taking 
Place within
6.      Import Documentation Duration and Cargo Delivery
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ITEMS
Mostly 
Resp.
Reasonably 
Resp.
Fairly Resp. 
Poorly 
Resp.
Not Resp.
 UQP Revenue Office 5.9 5.9 11.8 64.7 0
 Documentation Office 0.0 5.9 23.5 47.1 29.4
 Gate and Check Point 11.8 11.8 29.4 0.0 17.6
 Container Delivery 0.0 11.8 29.4 35.3 0.0
 Punctuality(Timekeeping) 0.0 11.8 0.0 41.2 0.0
Comments:
Organization        
Mostly 
Resp.
Reasonable 
Resp.
Fairly Resp.
Poorly 
Resp.
Not Resp.
UQP 5.9 5.9 11.8 35.3 0.0
GCPI(Port Authority) 5.9 5.9 0.0 35.3 35.3
Customs 0.0 5.9 0.0 35.3 29.4
Navy Inspection 0.0 5.9 23.5 11.8 0.0
Others 5.9 0.0 29.4 35.3 17.6
Poor
Sources
Rebate 5.9 0.0 11.8 5.9 5.9
Cargo Damage 5.9 11.8 41.2 0.0 17.6
Grounded 11.8 41.2 29.4 5.9 5.9
Primary Claims 0.0 5.9 35.3 41.2 0.0
 Pilferage 0.0 0.0 0.0 47.1 0.0
Theft 5.9 29.4 0.0 0.0 0.0
Other Motives (Persuasion) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Total 17 17 17 17 17
No comments
Main reason of delay is the custom formalities and ministry of finance 
regulation rely exemption
Comments:
Comments:
Major 
Sources
Reasonable 
Sources
Fair Sources
Negligible 
Source
9. Source of Claims Raised Against UQP and GCPI
Source of Claim            
Port is not secured against pilferage and theft at all
8.      Port Community Service Provide Responsible for Cargo Delivery Delays.
7.      Office Responsible for Delays within UQP Authority 
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Type of Service Interested Very Much Reasonably Fairly  Poorly Not at all 
Cargo Clearance 0.0 17.6 0.0 52.9 17.6
Email Services 0.0 17.6 0.0 0.0 0.0
Bills Settlements 0.0 41.2 29.4 0.0 0.0
National Shipping Agency Co. 0.0 17.6 0.0 41.2 11.8
Comments:
UQP Offices         Very Good 
Reasonably 
Good 
Fairly Good Poorly Not at all 
Documentation 0.0 0.0 5.9 52.9 0.0
Container Inspection Area for Custom 
List Preparation
17.6 0.0 17.6 47.1 0.0
Container Loading List Preparation 17.6 0.0 17.6 29.4 0.0
Port Financial Office 5.9 5.9 41.2 0.0 0.0
Motor Vehicle Section 5.9 5.9 41.2 0.0 0.0
Delivery of Containers 5.9 5.9 52.9 0.0 0.0
Commercial Department 5.9 5.9 52.9 0.0 17.6
Comments:
Name:
Company:
Grade:
custom office.
time the consignees need a whole day to find his containe
11.  Observation of “ First in First Served” in Providing Service in UQP Offices
10.  Interests on EDI Web for Port Users
General Comments
General Comments:
1.Long procedures and routine for in/out the trucks.
2. every month the financial ministry issued a new decision to
3.Cargoes and Containers have no organized  yard therefore some- 
4.There is no sufficient equipment for loading and unloading.
5. All shore cranes are always faced to out of order.
6. The staff is need to train.
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APPENDIX (3) MONTHLY MUD DREDGING CARRY IN 2010  
Dredger Vessels Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec
Basrah 144000 138600 185400 133200 5400 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Al-Zubair 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Tahreer 108000 118000 164000 172000 134000 156000 140000 64000 180000 130000 75950
Marbid 98000 64000 190000 166000 108000 86000 180000 118000 130000 134000 126000
Teba 108000 189000 165000 246000 183000 159000 174000 210000 180000 192000 138000
Saif Al-Karar 0 0 38400 181200 184800 97200 268800 250800 70800 178800 15600
Ram Allah 122400 157200 171600 26400 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Nasria 106500 23250 107250 135000 177000 112500 78000 92250 9750 104050 113250
Total 686900 690050 1021650 1059800 792200 610700 840800 735050 570550 738850 468800 0
General Note 1. All dredgers had failures of Generators and Main engines for several times during the work time
2. Shortage in availability of the spare parts
 3. Long government procedures to provide the spare parts by technical and financial committees causing the delay of the maintenance
Monthly Dredgers' Report in 2010 for Mud loads in Metric Tons  
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APPENDIX (4) VESSELS CALLING UQP IN 2010 TO 2012 
ITEM UNIT 2010 2011 2012 AVR Total
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
  a.  Containers Unit 390 345 350 362 1,085
Gt 2,776,358 2,662,142 3,475,367 2,971,289 8,913,867
  b.  Grains UNIT 38 54 52 48 144
Gt 1,800,999 2,748,557 2,637,732 2,395,763 7,187,288
  c. Rice UNIT 30 33 33 32 96
Gt 947,383 1,049,057 1,092,684 1,029,708 3,089,124
  d.  Sugar UNIT 28 38 32 33 98
Gt 455,656 783,413 714,794 651,288 1,953,863
  e.  Cements Unit 27 22 6 18 55
Gt 483,142 425,391 129,008 345,847 1,037,541
  f. General Cargo Unit 335 291 252 293 878
Gt 528,659 662,628 681,959 624,415 1,873,246
  g. Passangers & Goods Unit 59 0 0 20 59
Gt 99,671 0 0 33,224 99,671
  h. Pipes & Iron Unit 59 52 63 58 174
Gt 347,461 232,553 514,862 364,959 1,094,876
  i. Cars Unit 95 57 45 66 197
Gt 100,136 58,376 88,784 82,432 247,296
  j.  Others Unit 45 100 89 78 234
G 0 0 0 0 0
TOTAL Unit 1,106        992           922                 1,007            3,020
Gt 7,539,465 8,622,117 9,335,190       8,498,924     25,496,772
TOTAL Unit 1,106        992           922                 1,007            
Gt 7,539,465 8,622,117 9,335,190       
Gt (000) 7,539        8,622        9,335              
YEARS Vessels GT Vsls Growth% GT Growth%
2010 1106 7539465
2,011     992 8622117 -3.774834437 4.246231641
2,012     922 9335190 -2.317880795 2.796718738
TOTAL 3020 25496772 -3.046357616 3.521475189
Yearly Growth
UQP Years
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APPENDIX (5) WILHELMSEN-STATEMENT OF FACTS-M/V SIREEN-B 
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WILHELMSEN-STATEMENT OF FACTS- M/V SIREEN-B 
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APPENDIX (5-B) TURNAROUND TIME CALCULATIONS OF M/V SIREEN-B 
Ship name M/V SIREEN-B Cargo Type
Arrival at entrance buoy 11/02/2011 14:45 Sugar
Anchored outer anchorage 11/02/2011 14:50
Pilot on board 12/02/2011 14:50
Starts manoeuvring 12/02/2011 15:48
Ship at berth 12/02/2011 21:45
Vessel free pratique granted 12/02/2011 22:10
Samples taken for cargo 12/02/2011 23:00
Analysis result received 18/02/2011 15:00
Cargo Custom Clearance 20/02/2011 14:00
Operations start ((Commenced)) 20/02/2011 17:35
Operations stopped due to Rain and B/T 20/02/2011 23:20 1
Operations restart 21/02/2011 07:00
Operation stopped for B/T 21/02/2011 23:10 2
Operations restart 22/02/2011 06:15
Operation stopped the vessel shifted astern 22/02/2011 11:20 3
Operations restart 22/02/2011 12:30
Operation stopped for Crane N. 1 out of order 22/02/2011 20:40 4 stop partly
Operations restart 22/02/2011 21:00
Operation stopped for end of shift and B/T 23/02/2011 00:25 5
Operations restart 23/02/2011 06:30
Operation stopped due to no trucks 23/02/2011 13:40 6
Operations restart 23/02/2011 14:00
Operation stopped due to no trucks 23/02/2011 20:50 7
Operations restart 24/02/2011 12:10
Operation stopped due to no trucks 24/02/2011 14:00 8
Operations restart 24/02/2011 15:00
Operation stopped due to no trucks, start B/T 24/02/2011 23:20 9
Operations restart 26/02/2011 07:00
End of operations 26/02/2011 17:30
Pilot on board 26/02/2011 19:45
Ship leaves the berth 26/02/2011 20:00
Ship leaves the port 27/02/2011 00:30
Mints Hrs Days
Average time in port (min) 22185.00 369.75 15.41
Average waiting time (min) 1503.00 25.05 1.04
Average manoeuvring time (min) 642.00 10.70 0.45
Average service/berth time (min) 20055.00 334.25 13.93
Average productive time (min) 4395.00 73.25 3.05
Average idle time (min) 15625.00 260.42 10.85
Average productive ratio (%) 21.9% 0% 0.02%
Grade of waitng (or Ave Waiting Rate) (%) 7.5% 0% 0%
Stopped
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APPENDIX (6) INCHCAPE-STATEMENT OF FACTS- M/V CAPTAIN HARRY 
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INCHCAPE-STATEMENT OF FACTS- M/V CAPTAIN HARRY 
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INCHCAPE-STATEMENT OF FACTS- M/V CAPTAIN HARRY 
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APPENDIX (6-B) TURNAROUND TIME CALCULATIONS OF M/V CAPTAIN 
HARRY 
Ship name M/V Captain Harry Cargo Type
Arrival at entrance buoy 08/01/2011 08:00 Bulk  Rice
Anchored in outer anchorage 08/01/2011 09:00
Anchored out and left anchorage 02/02/2011 18:30
Pilot on board 02/02/2011 19:50
Starts manoeuvring 02/02/2011 19:50
Ship at berth all lines fast 03/02/2011 01:12
Operations start ((Commenced)) 03/02/2011 20:20
Operations stopped due to no trucks 03/02/2011 22:20 1
Operations restart 04/02/2011 10:00
Operation stopped due to rains 04/02/2011 01:50 2
Operations restart 05/02/2011 08:10
Operation stopped due to rain 05/02/2011 16:15 3
Operations restart 06/02/2011 07:15
Operation stopped for Crane N. 1 out of order 07/02/2011 22:00 4
Operations restart 07/02/2011 23:30
Operation stopped for end of shift and B/T 08/02/2011 00:01 5
Operations restart 08/02/2011 01:00
Operation stopped due to no trucks 13/02/2011 07:00 6
Operations restart 13/02/2011 09:20
End of operations 14/02/2011 11:10
Cargo Documents Commence 14/02/2011 15:30
Cargo Documents Complete 14/02/2011 17:30
Pilot on board 14/02/2011 22:00
Ship leaves the berth 14/02/2011 22:35
Ship leaves the port 15/02/2011 02:40
Mints Hrs Days
Average time in port (min) 54400.00 906.67 37.78
Average waiting time (min) 36710.00 611.83 25.49
Average manoeuvring time (min) 602.00 10.03 0.42
Average service/berth time (min) 17123.00 285.38 11.89
Average productive time (min) 11581.00 193.02 8.04
Average idle time (min) 5507.00 91.78 3.82
Average productive ratio (%) 67.6% 1% 0.05%
Grade of waitng (or Ave Waiting Rate) (%) 214.4% 4% 0%
Stopped
 
